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In this section:
• United States Abstains on Security Council Resolution Criticizing Israeli Settlements
• United States Sanctions Russian Individuals and Entities After Accusing Russian
Government of Using Hacking to Interfere with U.S. Election Process; Congressional
Committees and Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies Continue to Investigate
President Trump’s Connections to Russian Officials
• Second Circuit Overturns $655 Million Jury Verdict Against Palestine Liberation
Organization and Palestinian Authority
• New Legislation Seeks to Confirm Immunity of Artwork and Facilitate Cultural
Exchange
• United States Confronts China over Seizure of Unmanned Drone in the South China Sea
• International Criminal Court Prosecutor Recommends Investigation of Potential War
Crimes in Afghanistan, Including Actions by U.S. Military and Central Intelligence
Agency
• United States Strikes Houthi-Controlled Facilities in Yemen, Reaffirms Limited Support
for Saudi-Led Coalition Notwithstanding Growing Concerns About Civilian Casualties
• United States Expands Military Operations in North Africa and Classifies al-Shabaab as a
Force “Associated” with Al Qaeda
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
United States Abstains on Security Council Resolution Criticizing Israeli Settlements
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.18
On December 23, 2016, the United States abstained from voting on a United Nations
Security Council resolution that condemned Israeli settlement construction, thereby allowing
the resolution to be adopted by a vote of 14–0.1 Israel’s response was swift and disapproving.
The text of Resolution 2334 follows:
The Security Council,
. . .
Reaffirming the obligation of Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obli-
gations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and recalling the advisory opinion rendered
on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice,
Condemning all measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of
the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, including, inter alia, the
construction and expansion of settlements, transfer of Israeli settlers, confiscation of land, dem-
olition of homes and displacement of Palestinian civilians, in violation of international humani-
tarian law and relevant resolutions,
Expressing grave concern that continuing Israeli settlement activities are dangerously imperilling
the viability of the two-State solution based on the 1967 lines,
Recalling the obligation under the Quartet Roadmap,2 endorsed by its resolution 1515 (2003), for
a freeze by Israel of all settlement activity, including “natural growth”, and the dismantlement of
all settlement outposts erected since March 2001,
Recalling also the obligation under the Quartet roadmap for the Palestinian Authority Security
Forces to maintain effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dis-
mantling terrorist capabilities, including the confiscation of illegal weapons,
Condemning all acts of violence against civilians, including acts of terror, as well as all acts of prov-
ocation, incitement and destruction,
. . .
Stressing that the status quo is not sustainable and that significant steps, consistent with the tran-
sition contemplated by prior agreements, are urgently needed in order to (i) stabilize the situation
and to reverse negative trends on the ground, which are steadily eroding the two-State solution and
entrenching a one-State reality, and (ii) to create the conditions for successful final status negoti-
ations and for advancing the two-State solution through those negotiations and on the ground,
1. Reaffirms that the establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian terri-
tory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and consti-
tutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the
achievement of the two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace;
1 UN SCOR, 7853rd mtg., UNDoc. S/PV.7853, at 4 (Dec. 23, 2016); SC Res. 2334, UNDoc. S/RES/2334
(Dec. 23, 2016) (adopted by a vote of 14–0–1).
2 [Editors’ note: The “Quartet Roadmap” refers to a plan developed in 2003 by the United States, the European
Union, the Russian Federation, and the UN secretary-general to advance the 1991Madrid Conference process for
peacefully resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Israeli Security Fence, 98 AJIL 349, 361 (2004).]
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2. Reiterates its demand that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement
activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and that it
fully respect all of its legal obligations in this regard;
3. Underlines that it will not recognize any changes to the 4 June 1967 lines, includ-
ing with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties through
negotiations;
4. Stresses that the cessation of all Israeli settlement activities is essential for salvaging
the two-State solution, and calls for affirmative steps to be taken immediately to
reverse the negative trends on the ground that are imperiling the two-State solution;
5. Calls upon all States, bearing in mind paragraph 1 of this resolution, to distin-
guish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the
territories occupied since 1967;
6. Calls for immediate steps to prevent all acts of violence against civilians, including
acts of terror, as well as all acts of provocation and destruction, calls for accountability
in this regard, and calls for compliance with obligations under international law for the
strengthening of ongoing efforts to combat terrorism, including through existing
security coordination, and to clearly condemn all acts of terrorism;
7. Calls upon both parties to act on the basis of international law, including interna-
tional humanitarian law, and their previous agreements and obligations, to observe
calm and restraint, and to refrain from provocative actions, incitement and inflamma-
tory rhetoric, with the aim, inter alia, of de-escalating the situation on the ground,
rebuilding trust and confidence, demonstrating through policies and actions a genuine
commitment to the two-State solution, and creating the conditions necessary for pro-
moting peace;
. . . .
In an address to the Security Council after the vote, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
UN Samantha Power said the United States’ abstention was consistent with long-standing,
bipartisan U.S. policy toward Israel and the Middle East. She quoted a 1982 statement by
President Ronald Reagan that “underscore[d] the United States’ deep and long-standing
commitment to achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace . . . .” and “highlight[ed] the
United States’ long-standing position that Israeli settlement activity in territories occupied
in 1967 undermines Israel’s security, harms the viability of a negotiated two-State outcome
and erodes prospects for peace and stability in the region.”3
Power also commented, however, that the U.S. decision had “not [been] straightforward,”
because Israel is “treated differently from other Member States” in the United Nations, as
evidenced by the number of Israel-specific resolutions adopted by the General Assembly
and Human Rights Council. Observing that the “Obama Administration has worked tire-
lessly to fight for Israel’s right simply to be treated just like any other country,”4 Power
explained:
3 UN SCOR, supra note 1, at 5.
4 Id.
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It is because this forum too often continues to be biased against Israel, because there are important
issues that are not sufficiently addressed in the resolution and because the United States does not
agree with every word in this text that the United States did not vote in favor of the resolution. But
it is because the resolution reflects the facts on the ground and is consistent with United States
policy across Republican and Democratic administrations throughout the history of the State of
Israel that the United States did not veto it.5
Power took particular care to distinguish Resolution 2334 from a similar resolution that had
been vetoed by the United States in 2011.6 Whereas the vetoed resolution “focused exclu-
sively on the settlements,” Power explained, Resolution 2334 “condemns violence, terrorism
and incitement, which also pose extremely grave risks to the two-State solution.”7
Finally, Power emphasized that the United States saw no tension between its increasing
criticisms of the “settlement problem” and its long-term alliance with Israel. On the first
point, she cited the increasing numbers of settlers (an additional 355,000 since the 1993
Oslo Accords) as well as recent statements by the Israeli prime minister describing his gov-
ernment as “‘more committed to settlements than any in Israel’s history.’”8 The settlements,
she said, “put the two-State solution at risk and threaten Israel’s stated objective to remain
both a Jewish State and a democracy.”9 On the second point, Power underscored that U.S.
criticism of the settlements would not compromise long-standing United States financial and
military support of Israel. She concluded: “Our vote today does not in any way diminish the
United States’ steadfast and unparalleled commitment to the security of Israel, the only
democracy in the Middle East.”10
At a speech presented at the State Department several days after the Security Council
adopted Resolution 2334, Secretary of State John Kerry offered extended remarks on
Resolution 2334 and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Kerry emphasized that the resolution
was consistent with established international law and long-standing U.S. policy.
Addressing the resolution’s conclusion that Israeli settlements are unlawful, he said:
[T]his resolution simply reaffirms statements made by the Security Council on the legality of set-
tlements over several decades. It does not break new ground. In 1978, the State Department Legal
Adviser advised the Congress on his conclusion that . . . the Israeli Government’s program of
establishing civilian settlements in the occupied territory is inconsistent with international law,
and we see no change since then to affect that fundamental conclusion.11
In that 1978 opinion, written during the Carter administration, the State Department legal
adviser noted that Israel had established some seventy-five civilian settlements in territories
captured during the 1967 war:
5 Id. at 6.
6 SC Draft Res., UN Doc. S/2011/24 (Feb. 18, 2011); UN SCOR, 6484th mtg. at 5, UN Doc. S/PV.6484
(Feb. 18, 2011) (Ambassador Susan Rice explained the U.S. veto: “While we agree with our fellow Council mem-
bers—and indeed with the wider world—about the folly and illegitimacy of continued Israeli settlement activity,
we think it unwise for this Council to attempt to resolve the core issues that divide Israelis and Palestinians.
Therefore, regrettably, we have opposed this draft resolution.”); see J.R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the
United States, 105 AJIL 333, 345–47 (2011).




11 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, John Kerry, Remarks on Middle East Peace (Dec. 28, 2016), at https://
2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/266119.htm [hereinafter Dec. 28, 2016 Kerry Remarks].
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On the basis of the available information, the civilian settlements in the territories occupied by
Israel do not appear to be consistent with the[] limits on Israel’s authority as belligerent occupant
in that they do not seem intended to be of limited duration or established to provide orderly gov-
ernment of the territories and, though some may serve incidental security purposes, they do not
appear to be required to meet military needs during the occupation.12
The 1978 legal adviser’s opinion also addressed Israel’s obligations as a party to the Fourth
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.13 Article
49, paragraph 6 of that treaty provides: “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer
parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”14 The legal adviser’s opin-
ion concluded that the Israeli civilian settlements “appear to constitute” a transfer within the
scope of that paragraph.15 Although the opinion has never been formally withdrawn, not all
successive administrations have endorsed it. While critical of Israeli settlements, President
Reagan had objected to describing them as illegal.16 And before its abstention to
Resolution 2334, the Obama administration’s position on the consistency of the settlements
with international law had been unclear.17
In his speech on Resolution 2334, Kerry also responded to criticism of the resolution for
describing East Jerusalem as “occupied territory.” Kerry emphasized continuity with prior
resolutions:
[T]o be clear, there was absolutely nothing new in last week’s resolution on that issue. It was one of
a long line of Security Council resolutions that included East Jerusalem as part of the territories
occupied by Israel in 1967, and that includes resolutions passed by the Security Council
under President Reagan and President GeorgeH.W. Bush. And remember that every U.S. admin-
istration since 1967, along with the entire international community, has recognized East
Jerusalem as among the territories that Israel occupied in the Six-Day War.18
Kerry closed his discussion of Resolution 2334 by stating:
12 Letter from the State Department Legal Adviser Concerning Legality of Israeli Settlements in the Occupied
Territories, Apr. 21, 1978, reproduced in 17 ILM 777, 778 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Opinion].
13 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST
3516 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. See also Theodor Meron, The West Bank and International
Humanitarian Law on the Eve of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Six-Day War (in this issue of AJIL).
14 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 13, Art. 49, para. 6.
15 1978 Opinion, supra note 12, at 779.
16 Glenn Kessler, 1979 State Dept. Legal Opinion Raises New Questions About Israeli Settlements, WASH. POST
(June 17, 2009), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/16/AR2009061603285.
html; Bernard Gwertzman, State Department; About theWest Bank and the Emperor’s Clothes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25,
1983), at http://www.nytimes.com/1983/08/25/us/state-department-about-the-west-bank-and-the-emperor-s-
clothes.html (In a meeting with reporters two weeks after his inauguration, Reagan told them: “‘As to the
West Bank, I believe the settlements there—I disagreed when the previous Administration referred to them as
illegal—they’re not illegal.’ He added, however, that the Israeli effort to continue to build new settlements was
‘unnecessarily provocative.’”).
17 During the summer of 2009, the State Department spokesperson declined to say whether the administration
stood by the 1978 opinion. Kessler, supra note 16. Likewise, when the 2011 Security Council resolution on Israeli
settlements came up for a vote, the United States had not yet declared settlement building illegal. See David
E. Sanger, U.S. Tries to Head Off Vote Against Israeli Settlements, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2011), at http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18israel.html; see also Crook, supra note 6, at 346 (noting press
reports suggested that the United States would have agreed to calling the settlements “illegitimate,” but not
“illegal”).
18 Dec. 28, 2016 Kerry Remarks, supra note 11.
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In the end, we did not agree with every word in this resolution. There are important issues that are
not sufficiently addressed or even addressed at all. But we could not in good conscience veto a
resolution that condemns violence and incitement and reiterates what has been for a long time
the overwhelming consensus and international view on settlements and calls for the parties to
start taking constructive steps to advance the two-state solution on the ground.19
Israel objected fiercely to the resolution. Its permanent representative to the United
Nations called on the Security Council to
put an end to the bias and obsession with Israel, stop such endless attempts to blame all the prob-
lems of theMiddle East on the one true democracy in the region andmake clear to the Palestinians
that the only way forward is to end the incitement and terror and enter into direct and meaningful
negotiations with Israel.20
PrimeMinister BenjaminNetanyahu’s office said that “[t]heObama administration had ‘not
only failed to protect Israel against this gang-up at the UN, it ha[d] colluded with it behind the
scenes.’”21 Netanyahu emphasized his hope that things would be different under the incoming
Trump administration, saying that he looked forward to working with the president-elect “to
negate the harmful effects of this absurd resolution.”22 Israel also retaliated against several of the
resolution’s co-sponsors, recalling its ambassadors to New Zealand and Senegal and canceling
the Senegalese foreign minister’s planned visit to Israel.23 Israel also vowed to cut aid to
Senegal,24 and Prime Minister Netanyahu reported that he “already instructed to stop about
30 m shekels in funding to five UN bodies that are especially hostile to Israel.”25
The Palestinian representative to the United Nations, by contrast, praised the resolution,
saying it reflected “long-standing global consensus on the matter”:26
19 Id.
20 UN SCOR, supra note 1, at 15.
21 Ruth Eglash, Netanyahu Summons U.S. Envoy over Anti-Settlement Resolution Adopted by U.N., WASH. POST
(Dec. 25, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/netanyahu-reprimands-nations-that-supported-un-
settlement-resolution/2016/12/25/0519946f-3cdc-4e0c-96b3-a9926750dae0_story.html. TheObama adminis-
tration denied the accusation of collusion. The press quoted a senior Obama administration official as saying:
To be clear: from the start, this was an Egyptian resolution. The Egyptians authored it, circulated it, and
submitted it for a vote on Wednesday evening before asking for a delay and subsequently removing their
sponsorship. Contrary to some claims, the administration was not involved in formulating the resolution
nor have we promoted it.
Stephen Collinson, David Wright & Elise Labott, US Abstains as UN Demands End to Israeli Settlements,
CNN.com (Dec. 24, 2016), at http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/23/politics/israel-official-rips-obama-un-
settlements.
22 Ruth Eglash & Carol Morello, Netanyahu Blasts U.N., Obama over West Bank Settlements Resolution, WASH.
POST (Dec. 24, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/netanyahu-calls-un-resolution-on-settlements-
shameful/2016/12/23/2d45fbac-c94cf-11e6-bf4b-2c064d32a4bf_story.html. The permanent representative had
offered similar criticism. Collinson, supra note 21 (“It was to be expected that Israel’s greatest ally would act in
accordance with the values that we share and that they would have vetoed this disgraceful resolution. I have no
doubt that the newU.S. administration and the incomingUN Secretary General will usher in a new era in terms of
the UN’s relationship with Israel.”).
23 Peter Beaumont, Israel Rejects ‘Shameful’ UN Resolution amid Criticism of Netanyahu, GUARDIAN (Dec. 24,
2016), at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/24/israel-rejects-shameful-un-resolution-amid-criti-
cism-of-netanyahu.
24 Eglash, supra note 21.
25 Beaumont, supra note 23.
26 UN SCOR, supra note 1, at 16.
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES2017 481
Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, the eternal cap-
ital of the State of Palestine, have no legal validity, constitute flagrant breaches under international
law, namely the Fourth Geneva Convention, and constitute a major obstacle to peace, gravely
diminishing the viability of the two-State solution based on the 4 June 1967 borders and the pos-
sibility of realizing it.27
He dismissed Israel’s claims of being “bashed” and said the resolution “may rightly be seen as a
last attempt to preserve the two-state solution” that, for many, “seems virtually impossible at
this point as Israel, the occupying Power, has been permitted to entrench its occupation and a
one-State reality with absolute impunity, at times even being rewarded for its violations and
intransigence.”28
Domestically, the Obama administration faced criticism from Republicans, including
House Speaker Paul Ryan,29 Senator John McCain,30 and Senator Lindsey Graham,31 as
well as from some Democrats, including Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer.32
Then-President-elect Donald Trump denounced the resolution and criticized the decision
not to veto it. He tweeted: “As to the U.N., things will be different after Jan. 20th.”33 He
described the resolution as a “big loss . . . for Israel in the United Nations [that] will make
it much harder to negotiate peace.”34
Since Trump’s inauguration, however, his administration seems to have taken a somewhat
more critical view of settlements. In a February 2 statement, Press Secretary Sean Spicer said:
“While we don’t believe the existence of settlements is an impediment to peace, the construc-
tion of new settlements or the expansion of existing settlements beyond their current borders
may not be helpful in achieving that goal.”35 Trump seemed to go further on February 10,
reportedly telling an Israeli newspaper that settlements “don’t help the process” and that “he
did not believe that ‘going forward with these settlements is a good thing for peace.’”36
During his first meeting with Netanyahu as president, Trump said at their joint press con-
ference on February 15:
I reject unfair and one-sided actions against Israel at theUnitedNations—just treated Israel, in my
opinion, very, very unfairly—or other international forums, as well as boycotts that target Israel
. . . . As far as settlements, I’d like to see [Israel] hold back on settlements for a little bit. We’ll work
something out. But I would like to see a deal be made. I think a deal will be made.37
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 House Speaker Ryan, Senator McCain Condemn U.S. Abstention on U.N.’s Israel Vote, REUTERS (Dec. 23,
2016), at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-un-ryan-idUSKBN14C220.
30 Id.
31 Eglash, supra note 21.
32 Jeremy Berke,Democrats Scorch Obama over UN Vote Condemning Israeli Settlements, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec.
23, 2016), at http://www.businessinsider.com/un-israel-vote-obama-democrats-2016-12.
33 Rick Gladstone, Trump and U.N. Leader Discuss ‘Cooperation,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), at https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/01/04/world/americas/united-nations-donald-trump-antonio-guterres.html.
34 Collinson, supra note 21.
35WhiteHouse Press Release, Statement by the Press Secretary (Feb. 2, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2017/02/02/statement-press-secretary.
36 Peter Baker, Trump Adopts a Harder Line on Israeli Settlements, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), at https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/middleeast/trump-adopts-a-harder-line-on-israeli-settlements.html.
37 White House Press Release, Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in Joint
Press Conference (Feb. 15, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/15/remarks-presi-
dent-trump-and-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel-joint-press.
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United States Sanctions Russian Individuals and Entities After Accusing Russian Government of
Interfering with U.S. Election Process; Congressional Committees and Intelligence and Law
Enforcement Agencies Continue to Investigate President Trump’s Connections to Russian
Officials
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.21
On October 7, 2016, following months of tense interactions between the United States
and Russia regarding hacks of high-profile U.S. political organizations, the Department of
Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued a
joint statement formally accusing Russia of using cyberattacks to influence the U.S. election
process.1 Reports suggest that Russia intended to use the hacks and subsequent information
dump to help then-candidate Donald Trump win the presidential election.2 In response to
the cyberattacks, the United States took steps against several Russian individuals and entities.3
The Obama administration also initiated an extensive review of Russian involvement in the
election, which eventually reaffirmed key intelligence conclusions regarding the scope of
Russian interference.4 Several congressional committees have also initiated investigations,
all of which are still ongoing as of the date of publication.5
Several incidents appeared to trigger the U.S. accusation. The first, reported in June 2016,
occurred when hackers breached the Democratic National Committee (DNC) computer net-
work and gained access to its entire database of research on Donald Trump, who was by that
time the presumptive Republican presidential nominee.6 A private cybersecurity incident
response group, CrowdStrike, investigated the breach at theDNC’s request. CrowdStrike con-
cluded that the hacks were perpetrated by two entities—known as “Cozy Bear” and “Fancy
Bear”7—each working independently on behalf of a different Russian intelligence service.8
1 The statement is described in more detail below. See infra text at notes 33–34.
2 See infra notes 52–56 and corresponding text.
3 See infra notes 89–97 and corresponding text.
4 See infra notes 66–71, 117–27 and corresponding text.
5 See infra notes 72–78 and corresponding text.
6 Ellen Nakashima, Russian Government Hackers Penetrated DNC, Stole Opposition Research on Trump, WASH.
POST (June 14, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-government-hack-
ers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-trump/2016/06/14/cf006cb4-316e-11e6-8ff7-
7b6c1998b7a0_story.html. The DNC had apparently become aware of the hack in late April 2016. See id.
7 See Dmitri Alperovitch, Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, CROWDSTRIKE
(June 15, 2016), at https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee.
According to CrowdStrike, Fancy Bear had infiltrated the network in April 2016, and the DNC discovered
this breach. SeeNakashima, supra note 6. Cozy Bear, on the other hand, gained access to the network in summer
2015, and had been monitoring the Democratic National Committee's (DNC) email and chat communications
since that time. See id.
8 Alperovitch, supra note 7. According to CrowdStrike, Russia’s three main intelligence services have a “highly
adversarial relationship” with one another. They
have overlapping areas of responsibility, but also rarely share intelligence and even occasionally steal sources
from each other and compromise operations. Thus, it is not surprising to see them engage in intrusions
against the same victim, even when it may be a waste of resources and lead to the discovery and potential
compromise of mutual operations.
Id.
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Later that day, an entity named “Guccifer 2.0”—later identified byU.S. intelligence officials as
an agent of Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)9—declared itself to be the “lone
hacker” of the DNC’s network, posting several of the purportedly stolen documents.10 In
response, CrowdStrike asserted that “these claims do nothing to lessen our findings relating
to the Russian government’s involvement.”11
TheWhite House and State Department both declined to provide details about any inves-
tigation.12 In contrast, the Kremlin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said: “I completely rule out
a possibility that the [Russian] government or the government bodies have been involved in
this.”13 An adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin on Internet issues added:
Usually these kinds of leaks take place not because hackers broke in, but . . . because someone
simply forgot the password or set the simple password 123456. . . . [I]t’s always simpler to explain
this away as the intrigues of enemies, rather than one’s own incompetence.14
The next incident occurred in July 2016, whenWikiLeaks released nearly twenty thousand
emails from the DNC, many of them including embarrassing information about the inner
workings of the DNC.15 It was unclear how WikiLeaks had obtained the emails, but some
of them had earlier been published by Guccifer 2.0.16 According to press reports, U.S.
9 Charlie Savage &Nicole Perlroth, Is D.N.C. E-mail Hacker a Person or a Russian Front? Experts Aren’t Sure, N.
Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/politics/is-dnc-email-hacker-a-person-or-
a-russian-front-experts-arent-sure.html (discussing Guccifer 2.0’s connection with Russia’s Main Intelligence
Directorate (GRU)). A subsequent media report indicated that Guccifer 2.0 was one of two “outlets” created
by Fancy Bear, a “G.R.U.-controlled unit,” in order to make the hacked documents public. See David
E. Sanger & Scott Shane, Russian Hackers Acted to Aid Trump in Election, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9,
2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/us/obama-russia-election-hack.html.
10 Guccifer2, Guccifer 2.0 DNC’s Servers Hacked by a Lone Hacker, GUCCIFER 2.0 (June 15, 2016), at https://
guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/06/15/dnc/.
11 Alperovitch, supra note 7.
12 U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (June 14, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/
06/258467.htm (“I[’ve] just seen these recent press reports. I don’t have anything to corroborate them. I’d refer
you to the Democratic National Committee and to law enforcement authorities to speak to . . . these reports.”);
White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (June 15, 2016), at https://obamawhite-
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/15/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-61516 (“[F]or any
sort of discussion about a federal government response, I’d refer you to the FBI. . . . And I’m just not able to
comment on this in much detail because I don’t weigh into even potential law enforcement or international secur-
ity investigations.”).
13 Nakashima, Russian Government, supra note 6.
14 Andrew Roth, Russia Denies DNC Hack and Says Maybe Someone “Forgot the Password,” WASH. POST (June
15, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/15/russias-unusual-response-to-
charges-it-hacked-research-on-trump.
15 See Tom Hamburger & Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks Releases Thousands of Documents About Clinton and
Internal Deliberations, WASH. POST (July 22, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/
wp/2016/07/22/on-eve-of-democratic-convention-wikileaks-releases-thousands-of-documents-about-clinton-
the-campaign-and-internal-deliberations.
16 David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C., N.Y. TIMES (July
26, 2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/us/politics/spy-agency-consensus-grows-that-russia-hacked-
dnc.html. The founder ofWikiLeaks, Julian Assange, has claimed that the “Russian government is not the source.”
Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, Secret CIA Assessment Says Russia Was Trying to Help Trump Win
White House, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
obama-orders-review-of-russian-hacking-during-presidential-campaign/2016/12/09/31d6b300-be2a-11e6-94ac-
3d324840106c_story.html; see also infra note 109 and corresponding text. Yet, according to media reports,
intelligence agencies identified individuals connected to the Russian government who provided WikiLeaks
with the hacked documents. See Entous, Nakashima & Miller, supra.
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intelligence agencies had “high confidence” that the Russian government was responsible for
the DNC breach,17 although they were less certain whether the exploit was designed to influ-
ence the election or was more routine cyberespionage.18
When asked whether Russia wanted to interfere with the election, President Obama
acknowledged in July that “experts have attributed [the DNC hack] to the Russians,” but
then noted that “[a]nything’s possible.”19 Secretary Kerry stated that he had “raise[d] the
issue of the DNC” when meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, but said
that “before we draw any conclusions in terms of what happened or who is behind it it’s
very important that whatever public information is put out is based on fact. . . . [A]nd we
will continue to work to see precisely what those facts are.”20 White House Press Secretary
Josh Earnest reiterated that the White House had not yet adopted an official position:
There’s plenty of speculation out there. I recognize there’s been an analysis done that has indicated
that the Russians are likely to blame, but that is not a conclusion that the FBI has chosen to pub-
licize at this point. They’re conducting an ongoing investigation, and so I’ll let them speak to
whether or not they’ve made such a determination, and I’ll let them speak to whether they believe
it’s appropriate to go public with such a determination.21
Press Secretary Earnest later emphasized, in September 2016, that the FBI was
cognizant of the fact that as soon as they make a declaration like that most people are going to
understandably be interested in seeing that evidence. And some of that evidencemay not be some-
thing that we want to show.We don’t necessarily want to reveal sources and methods that the FBI
uses to conduct these kinds of investigations. . . .
The other thing . . . that’s relevant here is the United States also may be in a position where we
want to respond but not announce it in advance, or maybe not announce it ever.22
Russian officials continued to deny any role in releasing the DNC’s emails. Asked what he
had told Secretary Kerry, Foreign Minister Lavrov replied: “Well, I don’t want to use four-
letter words.”23 Likewise, Deputy ForeignMinister Sergey Ryabkov asserted: “Only spin doc-
tors who see conspiracy theories everywhere could imagine that Russia is trying to push this
election to any specific candidate by hacking into some servers. In reality, this is simply impos-
sible.”24 Putin made a similar statement regarding the DNC incident:
17 Sanger & Schmitt, supra note 16.
18 Id.
19 President Obama on Russian DNC Hack Involvement: “Anything’s Possible,” NBC NEWS (July 26, 2016), at
http://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/president-obama-on-russian-dnc-hack-involvement-anything-s-
possible-732675139636.
20 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, John Kerry, Press Availability in Vientiane, Laos (July 26, 2016), available
at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260475.htm.
21 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (July 28, 2016), at https://obama-
whitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/28/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-72816.
22 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Sept. 15, 2016), at https://oba-
mawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/15/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-91516.
23Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, ForeignMinister Sergey Lavrov’s Answer to aMedia
Question Before theMeeting with the US Secretary of State John Kerry, Vientiane (July 26, 2016), at http://www.
mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/
2370461.
24 Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov
Interviewed by Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn Magazine (Aug. 10, 2016, 7:44 PM), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/
guest/nota-bene/-/asset_publisher/dx7DsH1WAM6w/content/id/2386924.
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I know absolutely nothing about it, and Russia has never done anything like this at the State level.
Frankly speaking, I could never even imagine that such information would be of interest to the
American public or that the campaign headquarters of one of the candidates—in this case, Mrs.
Clinton—apparently worked for her, rather than for all the Democratic Party candidates in an
equal manner. I could never assume that anybody would find it interesting. Thus, in view of
what I have said, we could not officially hack it.25
Shortly thereafter, media reports indicated that the FBI was also investigating a cyberattack
against the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC).26 The intrusion was
reportedly initiated by Fancy Bear, which was apparently working for the GRU.27 Given that
entity’s alleged role in the prior DNC breach,28 one administration official stated that the FBI
was treating theDNC andDCCCbreaches as a single investigation.29 As with theDNCbreach,
however, Kremlin spokesman Peskov denied that the Russian government was involved, stating
that “[w]e don’t see the point any more in repeating yet again that this is silliness.”30
A third incident heightened U.S. fears that Russia was attempting to influence the presi-
dential election directly. On August 29, a media report stated that hackers had targeted voter
registration systems in Illinois and Arizona.31 In addition, the FBI alerted Arizona state offi-
cials in June that Russian individuals were responsible for the hack in that state.32 However, a
spokesperson for Arizona’s secretary of state noted that the FBI had not said whether the per-
petrators were working for the Russian government.33
The various incidents and investigations finally led to an unusual joint statement on
October 7 by the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the DNI, in which
they formally accused Russia of using cyberattacks to interfere with the U.S. election process.
They said:
The U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) is confident that the Russian Government directed the
recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political
organizations. The recent disclosures of alleged hacked e-mails on sites like DCLeaks.com and
WikiLeaks and by the Guccifer 2.0 online persona are consistent with the methods and
25 President of Russ. Press Release, Interview to Bloomberg (Sept. 5, 2016), at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pres-
ident/news/52830.
26 See JosephMenn, Dustin Volz &Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: FBI Probes Hacking of Democratic Congressional
Group – Sources, REUTERS (July 29, 2016), at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-democrats-exclusive-
idUSKCN1082Y7; Ellen Nakashima, FBI Probes Suspected Breach of Another Democratic Organization
by Russian Hackers, WASH. POST (July 29, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
fbi-probes-suspected-breach-of-dccc-computers-by-russian-hackers/2016/07/28/71210464-5536-11e6-b7de-
dfe509430c39_story.html. One report claimed that the breach might have begun in June 2016. Menn, Volz &
Hosenball, supra.
27 Nakashima, FBI Probes Suspected Breach, supra note 26.
28 See supra note 7 and corresponding text.
29 Nakashima, FBI Probes Suspected Breach, supra note 26; see also Dustin Volz (@dnvolz), TWITTER (July 29,
2017, 7:09 AM), at https://twitter.com/dnvolz/status/759028001883451392 (publishing statement by
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) National Press Secretary Meredith Kelly that “[b]
ased on the information [the DCCC] ha[s] to date, we’ve been advised by investigators that this is similar to
other recent incidents, including the DNC breach”).
30 Menn, Volz & Hosenball, supra note 26.
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motivations of Russian-directed efforts. These thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with
the US election process. Such activity is not new to Moscow—the Russians have used similar tac-
tics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there.We
believe, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, that only Russia’s senior-most officials
could have authorized these activities.34
The statement noted that the United States was not yet prepared to accuse Russia of hack-
ing state voter registration systems:
Some states have also recently seen scanning and probing of their election-related systems, which
in most cases originated from servers operated by a Russian company. However, we are not now in
a position to attribute this activity to the Russian Government. The USIC and the Department of
Homeland Security . . . assess that it would be extremely difficult for someone, including a nation-
state actor, to alter actual ballot counts or election results by cyber attack or intrusion. This assess-
ment is based on the decentralized nature of our election system in this country and the number of
protections state and local election officials have in place. States ensure that voting machines are
not connected to the Internet, and there are numerous checks and balances as well as extensive
oversight at multiple levels built into our election process.35
The timing of the announcement was understood to be politically delicate. A senior
administration official stated that President Obama was “under pressure to act” soon
because a statement closer to Election Day might appear too political.36 A media report
claimed, however, that FBI Director James B. Comey advised the administration against
publishing the October 7 statement, since he was concerned about the propriety of what
some might view as a politically motivated intervention into the late stages of the
34 SeeDep’t of Homeland Sec. &Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence Press Release, Joint Statement from the
Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security (Oct.
7, 2016), at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-department-homeland-security-and-office-
director-national.
35 Id. In addition, after the statement was released, WikiLeaks published hacked emails from John D. Podesta,
the campaign chairman for Hillary Clinton. David E. Sanger & Charlie Savage,U.S. Says Russia Directed Hacks to
Influence Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/politics/us-formally-
accuses-russia-of-stealing-dnc-emails.html. Podesta said that he was “not happy about being hacked by the
Russians in their quest to throw the election to Donald Trump.” John Podesta (@johnpodesta), TWITTER
(Oct. 7, 2016, 4:42 PM), at https://twitter.com/johnpodesta/status/784539455453560833. It was not initially
clear whether the administration had also attributed this hack to the Russian government. See, e.g., White House
Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Oct. 21, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/the-press-office/2016/10/21/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-10212016 (“I believe what the intel-
ligence community and the Department of Homeland Security have said is that the kinds of tactics that we saw
with regard to the malicious activity on Mr. Podesta’s email account are similar to the kinds of tactics that we’ve
seen used in other places. . . . But I’m not aware of any sort of formal determination that ascribes responsibility to
one country or one actor with regard to the malicious activity in Mr. Podesta’s email account.”). However, a pri-
vate security firm later concluded that the same hackers were responsible for both the DNC and Podesta hacks.
Nicole Perlroth & Michael D. Shear, Private Security Group Says Russia Was Behind John Podesta’s Email Hack,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/us/private-security-group-says-russia-was-
behind-john-podestas-email-hack.html. In addition, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated on
January 5, 2017, that theOctober 7 statement could be extended toMr. Podesta’s emails, even if it did not include
them at the time, based on evidence gathered by the intelligence community after that statement. See Hearing to
Receive Testimony on Foreign Cyber Threats to the United States Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 115th Cong.
62 (2017), available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/17-01_01-05-17.pdf [hereinafter
Foreign Cyber Threats Hearing] (statement of James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of Nat’l Intelligence) (“I would
have to research the exact chronology of when John Podesta’s emails were compromised. But I think, though,
that bears on my statement that our assessment now is that is even more resolute than it was with that statement
on the 7th of October.”).
36 Sanger & Savage, supra note 35.
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presidential campaign.37 Consequently, the statement was released without the FBI’s
name on it, despite the fact that the FBI had taken the lead in investigating the DNC
and DCCC hacks.38
Russian officials dismissed the claims in the statement. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson
said that “[t]he US side has failed to provide any facts or arguments to corroborate its allega-
tions.”39 Similarly, Putin criticized
the hysteria the USA has whipped up over supposed Russian meddling in the American presiden-
tial election. The United States has plenty of genuinely urgent problems, it would seem, from
the colossal public debt to the increase in firearms violence and cases of arbitrary action by the
police.
You would think that the election debates would concentrate on these and other unresolved prob-
lems, but the elite has nothing with which to reassure society, it seems, and therefore attempt to
distract public attention by pointing instead to supposed Russian hackers, spies, agents of influ-
ence and so forth.
I have to ask myself and ask you too: Does anyone seriously imagine that Russia can somehow
influence the American people’s choice?40
Press Secretary Earnest, in response, said that Putin’s statement was “not surprising,” and did
not “undermine our confidence in the analysis that’s been put forward by the intelligence
community and the Department of Homeland Security.”41
In the wake of the October accusation, it was not immediately clear what measures the
United States might take in response. Earlier in the year, responding to inquiries about
how the United States would respond if the FBI concluded that the Russian government
was involved in the hacks, a White House deputy press secretary had said:
[G]enerally speaking, if you look at how the United States has responded to intrusions by state
actors into cyber infrastructure within the United States, there’s a whole host of options available
to us. That includes economic sanctions that would be housed at theDepartment of Treasury, and
37 Ellen Nakashima, Comey Was Concerned Publicly Blaming Russia for Hacks of Democrats Could Appear Too





39 Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria
Zakharova, Moscow (Oct. 13, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_pub-
lisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2498635#11; see also Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n Press
Release, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Interview with Amanpour Program on CNN International, Moscow
(Oct. 12, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_
publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/2497676 (“Now everybody in the United States is saying that it is
Russia which is running the United States presidential debate. It’s flattering, . . . but it has nothing to be explained
by the facts. We have not seen a single fact, a single proof. . . .”).
40 Vladimir Putin, President of Russ., Remarks at the 13th Annual Meeting of the Valdai International
Discussion Club (Oct. 27, 2016), at http://en.special.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/53151.
41 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Oct. 27, 2016), at https://obama-
whitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/27/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-10272016.
Indeed, even after the election took place, the Director of the National Security Agency, Adm. Michael S. Rogers,
reiterated that Russia’s hacking was “a conscious effort by a nation-state to attempt to achieve a specific effect.”
Wall Street Journal (@WSJ), TWITTER (Nov. 15, 2016, 2:02 PM), at https://twitter.com/WSJ/status/
798647324687929344.
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that does include law enforcement measures that could be taken out of the Department of
Justice.42
Elaborating after the October 7 statement was issued, Earnest asserted that the United States
would
ensure that [its] response is proportional. It is unlikely that our response would be announced in
advance. It’s certainly possible that the President could choose response options that we never
announce. The President has talked before about the significant capabilities that the U.S. govern-
ment has to both defend our systems in the United States, but also carry out offensive operations
in other countries. So there are a range of responses that are available to the President, and he will
consider a response that’s proportional.43
Vice President Biden followed up on October 15, saying:
We’re sending a message. We have the capacity to do it. . . . [President Putin wi]ll know it. And it
will be at the time of our choosing. And under the circumstances that have the greatest impact. . . .
And . . . to the extent that they [fundamentally alter the election], we will be proportional in what
we do.44
Vice President Biden further stated that he “hope[d]” the public would not know it when the
“message [wa]s . . . sent.”45 In response, Putin said that “[t]here [wa]s nothing surprising
about that [statement]. . . . You can expect anything from our US friends. But was there any-
thing new in what he said? As if we didn’t know that US government bodies snoop on and
wiretap everyone?”46
According tomedia reports, Obama contacted Putin privately inOctober to warn him about
using cyberattacks to disrupt the election.47TheWhiteHouse also sent amessage directly to the
42White House Press Release, Press Gaggle by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Eric Schultz En Route Atlanta,
Georgia (Aug. 1, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/08/01/press-gaggle-prin-
cipal-deputy-press-secretary-eric-schultz-en-route. See also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 109 AJIL 419, 419–22 (2015) (describing
U.S. response to North Korea hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment); 109 AJIL 880, 880–82 (2015) (describing
U.S. response to cyberattacks from China, some of which were characterized as economic espionage).
43 White House Press Release, Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Josh Earnest En Route Greensboro, NC (Oct.
11, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/11/press-gaggle-press-secretary-
josh-earnest-en-route-greensboro-nc. This statement is consistent with language used by President Obama before
the statement was released. SeeWhite House Press Release, Remarks by President Obama and PrimeMinister Lee
of Singapore in Joint Press Conference (Aug. 2, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
2016/08/02/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-lee-singapore-joint-press (“[W]e have provisions in
place where if we see evidence of a malicious attack by a state actor, we can impose potentially certain proportional
penalties.”).
44Meet the Press - October 16, 2016, NBCNEWS (Oct. 16, 2016), at http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/
meet-press-october-16-2016-n667251.
45 Id.
46 President of Russ. Press Release, Vladimir Putin Answered Questions from Russian Journalists (Oct. 16,
2016), at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53103.
47 David Ignatius, In Our New ColdWar, Deterrence Should Come Before Détente, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2016),
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/in-our-new-cold-war-deterrence-should-come-
before-detente/2016/11/15/051f4a84-ab79-11e6-8b45-f8e493f06fcd_story.html; see also David. E. Sanger,
Under the Din of the Presidential Race Lies a Once and Future Threat: Cyberwarfare, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6,
2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/us/politics/under-the-din-of-the-presidential-race-lies-a-once-
and-future-threat-cyberwarfare.html. President Obama later stated that he had also raised the issue with
President Putin even earlier, in September 2016. See White House Press Release, Press Conference by the
President (Dec. 16, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/16/press-confer-
ence-president [hereinafter Dec. 16 Press Conference] (“[I]n early September, when I saw President Putin in
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Russian government onOctober 31 regarding “malicious cyberactivity” that was “targetingU.S.
state election-related systems.”48 It did so using a special channel created as part of the Nuclear
Risk Reduction Center, using a template intended for crisis communication; use of this partic-
ular channel “was part of the messaging,” according to a senior administration official.49
Following the election, legislators called for further investigation into Russia’s influence on
the election. Senator Lindsey Graham demanded Senate hearings to determine if the Russian
government interfered with the election, asserting that “Putin should be punished” if that was
the case.50 Similarly, Representative Elijah Cummings, a member of the House Oversight
Committee, wrote to the committee’s chairman to ask for a “bipartisan” look at Russia’s
involvement in the election.51 However, neither the Senate nor the House of the
Representatives appeared to take any immediate steps in response to these requests.
On November 26, in response to questions regarding an investigation into the integrity of
the presidential election, a senior administration official stated:
The Kremlin probably expected that publicity surrounding the disclosures that followed the
Russian Government-directed compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions,
including from U.S. political organizations, would raise questions about the integrity of the elec-
tion process that could have undermined the legitimacy of the President-elect. Nevertheless, we
stand behind our election results, which accurately reflect the will of the American people.
The Federal government did not observe any increased level of malicious cyber activity aimed at
disrupting our electoral process on election day. . . . [W]e remained confident in the overall integ-
rity of electoral infrastructure, a confidence that was borne out on election day. As a result, we
believe our elections were free and fair from a cybersecurity perspective.
That said, since we do not know if the Russians had planned any malicious cyber activity for elec-
tion day, we don’t know if they were deterred from further activity by the various warnings the U.
S. government conveyed.52
Nonetheless, onDecember 9, it was reported that the CIA and other intelligence agencies had
determined with “high confidence” that the Russian government conducted the cyberattacks
in order to benefit Donald Trump in the election and to harmHillary Clinton’s candidacy.53
China, I . . . talk[ed] to him directly and t[old] him to cut it out, and there were going to be some serious con-
sequences if he didn’t.”).
48 David E. Sanger, White House Confirms Pre-election Warning to Russia over Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/us/politics/white-house-confirms-pre-election-warning-to-rus-
sia-over-hacking.html.
49 Ignatius, supra note 47.
50 Marina Fang, Lindsey Graham Calls for Senate Investigation into Whether Russia Hacked DNC, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 15, 2016), at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/russia-dnc-hack-lindsey-graham_us_582bb30
6e4b0e39c1fa703d5.
51 Tal Kopan, Top Democrat Calls for Investigation into Russia’s Role in US Election, CNN (Nov. 17, 2016), at
http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/17/politics/house-oversight-democrat-investigate-russia.
52 U.S. Statement on Reliability of Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/26/us/politics/us-statement-on-reliability-of-election-results.html.
53 See Entous, Nakashima &Miller, supra note 16; Sanger & Shane, supra note 9. The FBI apparently did not
initially join in this conclusion. See Mark Mazzetti & Eric Lichtblau, C.I.A. Judgment on Russia Built on Swell of
Evidence, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/11/us/politics/cia-judgment-intel-
ligence-russia-hacking-evidence.html. However, an email sent by CIA Director John Brennan on December 16
said that Brennan had “met separately with FBI [Director] . . . Comey andDNI . . . Clapper, and there [wa]s strong
consensus among [them] on the scope, nature, and intent of Russian interference in our presidential election.”
Adam Entous & Ellen Nakashima, FBI in Agreement with CIA that Russia Aimed to Help Trump Win White
House, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/clinton-blames-putins-
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Those agencies had previously indicated that they believed Russia had sought to undermine
confidence in the U.S. electoral system.54 However, the agencies reached a different conclu-
sion—that Russia also acted with the goal of electing Mr. Trump—based on significant cir-
cumstantial evidence supporting that inference.55 That evidence included another
intelligence finding, reached with high confidence, that the Russian government had also
hacked the computer systems of the Republican National Committee (RNC) but, according
to a senior administration official, “conspicuously released no documents.”56 One report
indicated that intelligence officials believed that President Putin was personally involved in
the Russian interference with the election, in part because of a “vendetta” against Mrs.
Clinton.57 Putin had previously accused Mrs. Clinton, as secretary of state, of personally
inciting protests against him following Russia’s parliamentary elections.58
President-elect Trump immediately denounced the agencies’ conclusion and the quality of
the underlying evidence. The same day the reports emerged, Trump’s transition office released a
statement criticizing the agencies:
These are the same people that said Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. The elec-
tion ended a long time ago in one of the biggest Electoral College victories in history. It’s now time
to move on and ‘Make America Great Again.’59
personal-grudge-against-her-for-election-interference/2016/12/16/12f36250-c3be-11e6-8422-eac61c0ef74d_-
story.html (first alteration in original).
54 Entous, Nakashima & Miller, supra note 16; see also Sanger & Shane, supra note 9.
55 Mazzetti & Lichtblau, supra note 53. The CIA had shared this assessment with key senators in a closed-door
briefing the week before these reports were made public. Entous, Nakashima & Miller, supra note 16. On
November 29, a group of seven Democrats from the Senate Intelligence Committee sent a letter to President
Obama, which said: “We believe there is additional information concerning the Russian Government and the
U.S. election that should be declassified and released to the public.” Letter from Ron Wyden et al. to the
President (Nov. 29, 2016), available at https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=D12DD589-5800-
4BEF-9F93-A0A122F38D29. According to administration officials, the senators specifically requested that the
White House release parts of the CIA’s closed-door presentation. Entous, Nakashima & Miller, supra note 16.
However, the White House did not take any apparent steps in response.
56 Sanger & Shane, supra note 9. then-RNC Spokesperson Sean Spicer disputed this claim, stating that “The
RNCwas not ‘hacked’. The @nytimes was told and chose to ignore.” Sean Spicer (@seanspicer), TWITTER (Dec. 9,
2016, 8:29 PM), at https://twitter.com/seanspicer/status/807442009778688000; see also Sanger & Shane, supra
note 9 (describing denials by RNC officials). FBI Director Comey later testified that
[t]here was evidence that there was hacking directed at . . . the RNC, but old domains of the RNC, that is,
e-mail domains that they were no longer using, and that information was harvested from there, but that it was
old stuff. None of that was released. We did not develop any evidence that the Trump campaign or the cur-
rent RNC was successfully hacked.
Russian Intelligence Activities: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017), avail-
able at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-russian-intelligence-activities [hereinafter
Russian Intelligence Activities Hearing] (statement of James Comey, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation).
57 William M. Arkin, Ken Dilanian & Cynthia McFadden, U.S. Officials: Putin Personally Involved in U.S.
Election Hack, NBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2016), at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-officials-putin-per-
sonally-involved-u-s-election-hack-n696146. When asked if he believed that President Putin had “authorized the
hack,” President Obama said: “Not much happens in Russia without Vladimir Putin. This is a pretty hierarchical
operation. Last I checked, there’s not a lot of debate and democratic deliberation, particularly when it comes to
policies directed at the United States.” Dec. 16 Press Conference, supra note 47.
58 Mazzetti & Lichtblau, supra note 53; see alsoDavid M. Herszenhorn & Ellen Barry, Putin Contends Clinton
Incited Unrest over Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2011), at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/world/europe/
putin-accuses-clinton-of-instigating-russian-protests.html.
59 Sanger & Shane, supra note 9.
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Addressing the reports a few days later, Trump reiterated his concerns:
I think it’s ridiculous. I think it’s just another excuse. . . .
[I]f you look at the story and you take a look at what they said, there’s great confusion. Nobody
really knows.
And hacking is very interesting. Once they hack, if you don’t catch them in the act, you’re not
going to catch them. They have no idea if it’s Russia or China or somebody. It could be somebody
sitting in a bed some place. I mean, they have no idea. . . .
I think the Democrats are putting [these reports] out because they suffered one of the greatest
defeats in the history of politics in this country. . . . It’s ridiculous.60
Putin’s response was similar. Questioning the strength of the agencies’ evidence, he said:
The defeated party always tries to blame somebody on the outside. They should be looking for
these problems closer to home.
Everybody keeps forgetting the most important point. For example, some hackers breached email
accounts of the US Democratic Party leadership. Some hackers did that. But, as the President-elect
rightly noted, does anyone know who those hackers were? Maybe they came from another country,
not Russia. Maybe somebody just did it from their couch or bed. These days, it is very easy to des-
ignate a random country as the source of attack while being in a completely different location.61
Despite the reports, the Obama administration declined to blame the results of the election
on the Russian government’s interference. Obama acknowledged that
[t]here’s no doubt that [the Russian hack of the DNC] contributed to an atmosphere in which the
only focus for . . . months at a time . . . wereHillary’s e-mails . . . [and] political gossip surrounding the
DNC. And that whole swirl that ended up dominating the news meant that . . . issues weren’t talked
about a lot in the coverage. Huge policy differences were not debated and vetted. . . . And I think in
that scrum, in that swirl, . . . Donald Trump and his celebrity and his ability to garner attention and
obviously tap into a lot of the anxieties and fears that some voters . . . definitely made a difference.62
However, he pointed out that “elections can always turn out differently. You never know
which factors are [going to] make a difference.”63 Likewise, the White House press secretary
did not elaborate on the administration’s position regarding the agencies’ determination.64
Nonetheless, he added that
you didn’t need a security clearance to figure out who benefitted from malicious Russian cyber
activity. The President-elect didn’t call it into question. He called on Russia to hack his opponent.
He called on Russia to hack Secretary Clinton.65 So he certainly had a pretty good sense of whose
side this activity was coming down on. The last several weeks of the election were focused on a
60 Exclusive: Donald Trump on Cabinet Picks, Transition Process, FOX NEWS (Dec. 11, 2016), at http://www.
foxnews.com/transcript/2016/12/11/exclusive-donald-trump-on-cabinet-picks-transition-process.
61 President of Russ. Press Release, Vladimir Putin, Annual News Conference (Dec. 23, 2016, 3:55 PM), at
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53573.
62 Transcript and Video: NPR’s Exit Interview with President Obama, NPR (Dec. 19, 2016, 5:00 AM), at http://
www.npr.org/2016/12/19/504998487/transcript-and-video-nprs-exit-interview-with-president-obama.
63 Id.
64 See White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Dec. 12, 2016), at https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/12/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-121216
[hereinafter Dec. 12 Press Briefing] (“If that’s something that can be shared publicly, that’s going to come from the
intelligence community. It’s not going to come from here.”).
65 [Editors’ note: In July 2016, Donald Trump said: “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the
30,000 emails that are missing”—an apparent reference to Hillary Clinton’s deleted emails. He added: “I think
you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press.” Ashley Parker & David E. Sanger, Donald Trump Calls on
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discussion of emails that had been hacked and leaked by the Russians. These were emails from the
DNC and John Podesta—not from the RNC and Steve Bannon.66
At the same time as the reports were published, a White House deputy press secretary
announced that Obama had “instructed the intelligence community to conduct a full review
of the pattern of malicious cyber activity related to our presidential election cycle,” and to
ensure that the subsequent “report be completed and submitted to him before the end of
his term.”67 The review was ordered with a comprehensive scope: “to look at malicious activ-
ity timed to our presidential election cycle. And so it will be broader than just looking at this
past election.”68 In fact, the review would “put [malicious cyber activity] in a greater context.
. . . dating all the way back to 2008.”69 As a result, the press secretary confirmed, the review
would not “be looking [just] at Russia,” but would instead “follow the facts wherever they
may lead[,] if that includes other either state actors or non-state actors.”70 Given that the
2008 election cycle, for example, involved cyber intrusions by Chinese actors, the review
would “be looking at all foreign actors and any attempt to interfere with the elections.”71
After the report was completed, the administration would
make public as much as we can. Obviously, . . . a report like this is going to contain highly sensitive
and even classified information, perhaps, so when that report is submitted we’re going to take a
look. We want to make sure we brief Congress and relevant stakeholders, like possibly state
administrators who actually operationalize the elections.72
In addition, several congressional committees announced that they would conduct their
own investigations into Russia’s interference with the 2016 election. Senator Mitch
McConnell stated on December 12 that a panel of senators from the Senate Intelligence
Committee, led by Senator Richard Burr, would pursue a bipartisan investigation of
Russia’s interference in the election.73 That inquiry would examine, among other things,
• [T]he intelligence that informed the Intelligence Community Assessment [ordered
by the White House];
Russia to Find Hillary Clinton’s Missing Emails, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/28/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-clinton-emails.html.]
66 Dec. 12 Press Briefing, supra note 64.
67White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Eric Schultz (Dec. 9, 2016), at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/09/press-briefing-principal-deputy-press-secre-
tary-eric-schultz-12916 [hereinafter Dec. 9 Press Briefing]. Media reports indicated that DNI Clapper would lead
the review. Entous, Nakashima & Miller, supra note 16.
68 Dec. 9 Press Briefing, supra note 67.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.; see also Ellen Nakashima, National Intelligence Director: Hackers Have Targeted 2016 Presidential
Campaigns, WASH. POST (May 18, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
national-intelligence-director-hackers-have-tried-to-spy-on-2016-presidential-campaigns/2016/05/18/2b174
5c0-1d0d-11e6-b6e0-c53b7ef63b45_story.html (summarizing previous election-related hacking incidents).
72 Dec. 9 Press Briefing, supra note 67.
73 Ed O’Keefe & Paul Kane,McConnell Announces Senate Probe of Suspected Russian Election Interference: “The
Russians Are Not Our Friends,” WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/power-
post/wp/2016/12/12/schumer-on-congressional-probe-of-russia-i-dont-want-this-to-turn-into-a-benghazi-
investigation; Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate and House Leaders Call for Inquiry of Russian Hacking in Election, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/politics/mcconnell-supports-inquiry-of-rus-
sian-hacking-during-election.html.
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• Counterintelligence concerns related to Russia and the 2016 U.S. election, including
any intelligence regarding links between Russia and individuals associated with polit-
ical campaigns;
• Russian cyber activity and other “active measures” directed against the U.S., both as it
regards the 2016 election and more broadly.74
House Speaker Paul D. Ryan also said that he supported an ongoing investigation by Rep.
Devin Nunes, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.75 That investigation
would address:
• Russian cyber activity and other “activemeasures” directed against the U.S. and its allies;
• Counterintelligence concerns related to Russia and the 2016 U.S. election, including
any intelligence regarding links between Russia and individuals associated with polit-
ical campaigns;
• The United States Government response to these Russian active measures and any
impact they may have on intelligence relationships and traditional alliances; and
• Possible leaks of classified information related to the Intelligence Community’s
assessments of these matters.76
Finally, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee indicated that the committee
would conduct a bipartisan inquiry regarding Russia’s cyberthreats to the military, which
could shed light on its interference with the election.77 Discussing these investigations, Press
Secretary Earnest noted that theWhiteHouse had “long supported the principle of congressional
review of” Russian interference in the election.78 He further stated that the Obama administra-
tion would “[a]bsolutely” cooperate in sharing information with the investigations, since “the [A]
dministration and national security professionals, both high-ranking officials and those farther
down the chain, have been in regular touch with members of Congress on this matter.”79
74 Richard Burr, U.S. Senator for N.C. Press Release, Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian
Intelligence Activities (Jan. 13, 2017), at https://www.burr.senate.gov/press/releases/joint-statement-on-commit-
tee-inquiry-into-russian-intelligence-activities.
75 Steinhauer, supra note 73.
76 U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence Press Release, Joint Statement on
Progress of Bipartisan HPSCI Inquiry into Russian Active Measures (Jan. 25, 2017), at http://democrats-intelli-
gence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=211.
77 See Face the Nation Transcript December 11, 2016: McCain, Conway, Sanders, FACE THE NATION (Dec. 11,
2016), at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcript-december-11-2016-mccain-conway-sanders
(noting statement by Senator JohnMcCain that “rogue states . . . view cyber as a form of warfare”); Jack Reed, U.S.
Senator for R.I. Press Release, Reed Backs Bipartisan Probe into Russian Cyberthreats (Dec. 9, 2016), at https://
www.reed.senate.gov/news/releases/reed-backs-bipartisan-probe-into-russian-cyberthreats.
Some senators also called for an independent commission to review Russian interference with the election. See
Ben Cardin, U.S. Senator for MD Press Release, Senators Cardin, Feinstein, Leahy Call for Independent
Nonpartisan Commission to Investigate Russian Interference in Election (Dec. 12, 2016), at https://www.car-
din.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/senators-cardin-feinstein-leahy-call-for-independent-nonpartisan-
commission-to-investigate-russian-interference-in-election; see also Charles Schumer, U.S. Senator for N.Y. Press
Release, Schumer Remarks Calling for Senate Select Committee to Investigate Russian Interference in 2016
Elections (Dec. 18, 2016), at https://www.schumer.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumer-remarks-call-
ing-for-senate-select-committee-to-investigate-russian-interference-in-2016-elections (outlining benefits of inde-
pendent committee). However, Senator McConnell and House Speaker Ryan asserted that the intelligence
committees were capable of conducting an inquiry on their own, and they did not take any steps to form an inde-
pendent commission. O’Keefe & Kane, supra note 73.
78 Dec. 12 Press Briefing, supra note 64.
79 Id.
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In addition, in an unusual step, a bipartisan group of electors from the Electoral College
wrote an open letter to DNI Clapper on December 12.80 The letter stated:
The Electors require to know from the intelligence community whether there are ongoing inves-
tigations into ties between Donald Trump, his campaign or associates, and Russian government
interference in the election, the scope of those investigations, how far those investigations may
have reached, and who was involved in those investigations. We further require a briefing on
all investigative findings, as these matters directly impact the core factors in our deliberations
of whether Mr. Trump is fit to serve as President of the United States.
Additionally, the Electors will separately require fromDonald Trump conclusive evidence that he and
his staff and advisors didnot acceptRussian interference, or otherwise collaborate during the campaign,
and conclusive disavowal and repudiation of such collaboration and interference going forward.81
Nonetheless, it does not appear that the Obama administration, the intelligence commu-
nity, or Trump himself disclosed any information in response to this request.
On December 29, the administration took several public actions to respond to Russian
interference with the election.82 First, Obama issued Executive Order 13,757, which
amended Executive Order 13,694 in order to allow sanctions against foreign actors engaging
in “cyber-enabled malicious activities that . . . . [t]amper with, alter, or cause a misappropri-
ation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election
processes or institutions.”83 Second, pursuant to the new executive order, Obama “sanc-
tioned nine entities and individuals: two Russian intelligence services (the GRU and the
FSB); four individual officers of the GRU; and three companies that provided material
80 Letter from Christine Pelosi, Cal. Presidential Elector et al. to James Clapper, Director of Nat’l Intelligence
(Dec. 12, 2016), available at https://extranewsfeed.com/bipartisan-electors-ask-james-clapper-release-facts-on-
outside-interference-in-u-s-election-c1a3d11d5b7b#.fsyd5dpsq.
81 Id.
82 See supra notes 42–45 and corresponding text.
83 White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
Harassment (Dec. 29, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/fact-sheet-
actions-response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity-and [hereinafter Fact Sheet]; see also Exec. Order No. 13,757
§1, 82 Fed. Reg. 1, 1 (Jan. 3, 2017). Executive Order 13,694 had stated, in relevant part:
(a) All property and interests in property that are in theUnited States, that hereafter come within theUnited
States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of the
following persons are blocked andmay not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:
(i) any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General
and the Secretary of State, to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, directly or
indirectly, cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in
substantial part, outside the United States that are reasonably likely to result in, or have materially
contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or
financial stability of the United States and that have the purpose or effect of:
(A) harming, or otherwise significantly compromising the provision of services by, a computer or
network of computers that support one or more entities in a critical infrastructure sector;
(B) significantly compromising the provision of services by one or more entities in a critical infra-
structure sector;
(C) causing a significant disruption to the availability of a computer or network of computers; or
(D) causing a significant misappropriation of funds or economic resources, trade secrets, personal
identifiers, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or private finan-
cial gain . . . .
Exec. Order No. 13,694 §1(a)(i)(A)–(D), 3 C.F.R. §297, 297 (2015); see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis
Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 109 AJIL 643, 658 (2015)
(describing order in detail).
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support to the GRU’s cyber operations.”84 Third, the Office of Foreign Assets Control
imposed sanctions on two individuals pursuant to Executive Order 13,694 for “engag[ing]
in significant malicious cyber-enabled misappropriation of financial information” or “per-
sonal identifiers” for private financial gain.85
Fourth, the State Department “declared persona non grata 35 Russian officials operating in
the United States who were acting in a manner inconsistent with their diplomatic or consular
status.”86 The State Department “also informed the Russian Government that it would deny
Russian personnel access to two recreational compounds in the United States owned by the
Russian Government.”87 A deputy spokesperson specified that the Department
took these actions as part of a comprehensive response to Russia’s interference in the U.S. election
and to a pattern of harassment of our diplomats overseas that has increased over the last four years,
including a significant increase in the last 12 months. This harassment has involved arbitrary
police stops, physical assault, and the broadcast on State TV of personal details about our person-
nel that put them at risk. In addition, the Russian Government has impeded our diplomatic oper-
ations by, among other actions: forcing the closure of 28 American corners which hosted cultural
programs and English-language teaching; blocking our efforts to begin the construction of a new,
safer facility for our Consulate General in St. Petersburg; and rejecting requests to improve perim-
eter security at the current, outdated facility in St. Petersburg.88
Finally, the Department of Homeland Security and FBI released a Joint Analysis Report
(the JAR) that expanded on the Obama administration’s October 7 statement accusing the
Russian government of interfering in the election.89 The JAR
84 Fact Sheet, supra note 83; see also Exec. Order No. 13,757, supra note 83, at §1 & Annex, 82 Fed. Reg. at 1, 3
(adding entities and individuals to list of persons who could be sanctioned under Executive Order 13,694). The five
entities sanctioned were the “Main Intelligence Directorate (a.k.a. Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie) (a.k.a.
GRU)”; the “Federal Security Service (a.k.a. Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) (a.k.a. FSB)”; “Special Technology
Center (a.k.a. STLC, Ltd. Special Technology Center St. Petersburg)”; “Zorsecurity (a.k.a. Esage Lab)”; and
“Autonomous Noncommercial Organization ‘Professional Association of Designers of Data Processing Systems’
(a.k.a. ANOPOKSI).” Id., at Annex, 82 Fed. Reg. at 3. “STLC . . . assisted theGRU in conducting signals intelligence
operations; Zorsecurity . . . provided the GRU with technical research and development; and . . . ANO PO KSI . . .
provided specialized training to the GRU.” Fact Sheet, supra note 83. The four individuals sanctioned were Igor
Valentinovich Korobov, Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov, Igor Olegovich Kostyukov, and Vladimir Stepanovich
Alexseyev. Exec. Order No. 13,757, supra note 83, at Annex, 82 Fed. Reg. at 3. Korobov is the current chief of
the GRU, and the other three individuals are deputy chiefs. Fact Sheet, supra note 83.
85 Fact Sheet, supra note 83; see also Issuance of Amended Executive Order 13694; Cyber-Related Sanctions
Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Dec. 29, 2016), at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20161229.aspx. The two individuals, Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev
and Aleksey Alekseyevich Belan, were sanctioned under Section 1(a)(i)(D) of Executive Order 13694. See Fact
Sheet, supra note 83; Exec. Order No. 13,694, supra note 83, at §1(a)(i)(D), 3 C.F.R. §297, 297. “Bogachev
and his cybercriminal associates [we]re responsible for the theft of over $100 million from U.S. financial institu-
tions, Fortune 500 firms, universities, and government agencies.” Fact Sheet, supra note 83. “Belan compromised
the computer networks of at least three major United States-based e-commerce companies.” Id.
86 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Department of State Actions in Response to Russian Harassment (Dec. 29,
2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/266145.htm [hereinafter Department of State Actions].
87 Id. State Department officials indicated that these compounds—in Upper Brookville, New York, and
Maryland’s Eastern Shore—were used for Russian intelligence activities, but it is unclear whether they were
used in connection with the election-related intrusions. David E. Sanger, Obama Strikes Back at Russia for
Election Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/russia-elec-
tion-hacking-sanctions.html.
88 Department of State Actions, supra note 86.
89 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Press Release, Joint DHS, ODNI, FBI Statement on Russian Malicious Cyber
Activity (Dec. 29, 2016), at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/12/29/joint-dhs-odni-fbi-statement-russian-mali-
cious-cyber-activity.
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provide[d] technical details regarding the tools and infrastructure used by the Russian civilian and
military intelligence Services (RIS) to compromise and exploit networks and endpoints associated
with the U.S. election, as well as a range of U.S. Government, political, and private sector
entities.90
As a summary in the JAR explained further, “[t]his activity by RIS is part of an ongoing cam-
paign of cyber-enabled operations directed at the U.S. government and its citizens.”
Consequently, “[t]his JAR provide[d] technical indicators related to many of these opera-
tions, recommended mitigations, suggested actions to take in response to the indicators pro-
vided, and information on how to report such incidents to the U.S. Government.”91
Moreover, Obama asserted that “[t]hese actions are not the sum total of our response to
Russia’s aggressive activities.Wewill continue to take a variety of actions at a time and place of
our choosing, some of which will not be publicized.”92 As a result, as a senior administration
official said,
there may be things that commence while we’re in office in addition to what we’re saying today.
When the [Trump] [A]dministration takes office, it’s entirely their judgment as to whether or not
they continue down the course that we have set in a number of different areas.93
Russia’s planned response was not immediately clear. The Russian foreignminister initially
said that Russia would
definitely respond to these actions. Reciprocity is a basic tenet of international diplomacy and
international relations. Therefore, the Russian Foreign Ministry and colleagues from other agen-
cies have submitted a proposal to the President of Russia to declare “persona non grata” 31 dip-
lomats from the US Embassy inMoscow and four diplomats from the US Consulate General in St
Petersburg. Furthermore, we have proposed shutting down the US dacha (recreation facility) in
Serebryanny Bor and the US Embassy warehouse onDorozhnaya Street.We hope these proposals
will be considered as a priority.94
Less than two hours later, however, Putin issued a statement that seemed to take a softer
line:
We regard the recent unfriendly steps taken by the outgoing US administration as provocative and
aimed at further weakening the Russia-US relationship. This runs contrary to the fundamental
interests of both the Russian and American people. Considering the global security responsibilities
of Russia and the United States, this is also damaging to international relations as a whole.
90 NAT’L CYBERSEC. & COMMC’NS INTEGRATION CTR. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, GRIZZLY STEPPE –
RUSSIANMALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY 1 (2016), at https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-
20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf. A summary in the Joint Analysis Report (JAR) noted that “[p]
revious JARs have not attributed malicious cyber activity to specific countries or threat actors. However, public
attribution of these activities to RIS is supported by technical indicators from the U.S. Intelligence Community,
DHS, FBI, the private sector, and other entities.” Id.
91 Id.
92 White House Press Release, Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber
Activity andHarassment (Dec. 29, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/
statement-president-actions-response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity.
93 White House Press Release, Press Call on the Administration Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity
and Harassment (Dec. 29, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/press-
call-administration-response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity-and.
94 Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on
Recent US Sanctions and the Expulsion of Russian Diplomats, Moscow (Dec. 30, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/
en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/2583996.
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As it proceeds from international practice, Russia has reasons to respond in kind. Although we
have the right to retaliate, we will not resort to irresponsible ‘kitchen’ diplomacy but will plan
our further steps to restore Russian-US relations based on the policies of the Trump
Administration.95
Some legislators sought to impose greater sanctions on Russia. Senators McCain and
Graham stated that these “retaliatory measures . . . [we]re a small price for Russia to
pay.”96 Consistent with this statement, on January 11, 2017, they cosponsored a bill with
several other senators that would, among other things, impose certain sanctions on “persons
engaging in significant activities undermining cybersecurity and democratic institutions,” as
well as “persons engaging in transactions with the intelligence or defense sectors of the
Government of the Russian Federation,” and would codify Executive Order 13694.97 In
addition, on February 8, Senator Graham introduced the Russia Sanctions Review Act of
2017.98 That bill would require the Trump administration to submit two items to
Congress before relaxing sanctions: (1) a description of any proposed sanctions relief; and (2)
a certification that Moscow had stopped supporting actions to undermine the government of
Ukraine and ceased cyberattacks against the United States.99 Congress would then have 120
days either to pass a joint resolution of disapproval or to decline to act on the sanctions relief.100
During this period, President-elect Trump’s position on Russian interference in the elec-
tion remained unclear. Responding to the Obama administration’s sanctions, President-elect
Trump simply stated that the “country [should] . . . move on to bigger and better things.”101
He then agreed to meet with intelligence officials so he could “be updated on the facts” of the
hacking.102 Before then, however, Julian Assange repeated his claim “that [WikiLeaks’]
source [wa]s not the Russian government and it [wa]s not a state party.”103 In response,
Trump noted that “Julian Assange . . . said Russians did not give him the info!”104 He
later clarified: “The dishonest media likes saying that I am in Agreement with Julian
Assange - wrong. I simply state what he states, it is for the people . . .105 to make up their
95 President of Russ. Press Release, Statement by the President of Russia (Dec. 30, 2016, 3:15 PM), at http://en.
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53678. Later that day, President-elect Trump noted his approval of this state-
ment on Twitter. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 30, 2016, 11:41 AM), at https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/814919370711461890 (“Greatmove on delay (by V. Putin) - I always knew he
was very smart!”).
96 John McCain, U.S. Senator AZ Press Release, McCain & Graham on New Sanctions Against Russia (Dec.
29, 2016), at http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=DFAE6FFD-976A-468C-B5
3B-15D548E46BD7.
97 Counteracting Russian Hostilities Act of 2017, S. 94, 115th Cong. §§103–05 (2017).
98 See Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, S. 341, 115th Cong. (2017).
99 Id. §4(a).
100 See id. §§4(b)–(c).
101 Michael D. Shear, Donald Trump, After Dismissing Hacking, Agrees to an Intelligence Briefing, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 29, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-hack.html.
102 Id.
103 Julian Assange: Our Source Is Not the Russian Government, FOX NEWS (Jan. 3, 2017), at http://www.foxnews.
com/transcript/2017/01/03/julian-assange-our-source-is-not-russian-government; see also infra note 15 (noting
similar previous assertion by Mr. Assange).
104 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 4, 2017, 4:22 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/816620855958601730.
105 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 5, 2017, 5:25 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/816999062562107392.
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own minds as to the truth.”106 That same day, however, Trump again questioned the attri-
bution of the election hacking to Russia: “TheD[NC] would not allow the FBI to study or see
its computer info after it was supposedly hacked by Russia . . . .107 So how and why are they so
sure about hacking if they never even requested an examination of the computer servers?
What is going on?”108 Vice President-elect Mike Pence claimed that Trump had “expressed
his very sincere and healthy American skepticism about intelligence conclusions.”109
However, DNI Clapper subsequently asserted that “there is an important distinction here
between healthy skepticism, which policymakers . . . should always have for intelligence, . . .
and disparagement.”110
At the January 6 briefing, intelligence officials presented Trumpwith the original, classified
version of the report that the CIA, FBI, and NSA had prepared based on the comprehensive
review ordered by President Obama.111 The declassified version of the report, released later
that day, stated:
We assess with high confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence cam-
paign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election, the consistent goals of which were to under-
mine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her
electability and potential presidency.
• We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect
Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and pub-
licly contrasting her unfavorably to him. . . .112
• In trying to influence the US election, we assess the Kremlin sought to advance its
longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, the promotion
of which Putin and other senior Russian leaders view as a threat to Russia and Putin’s
regime.
• Putin publicly pointed to the Panama Papers disclosure and the Olympic doping
scandal as US-directed efforts to defame Russia, suggesting he sought to use disclo-
sures to discredit the image of the United States and cast it as hypocritical.
106 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 5, 2017, 5:45 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/817004210529116160.
107 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 5, 2017, 4:30 PM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/817166353266262016.
108 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 5, 2017, 4:40 PM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/817168818539757568. Adding to these statements, the day before the intelligence
briefing, President-elect Trump stated that the focus on Russian interference with the election was a “political
witch hunt” to distract from the Democratic Party’s loss in the presidential election. See Michael D. Shear &
David E. Sanger, Putin Led a Complex Cyberattack Scheme to Aid Trump, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/us/politics/donald-trump-wall-hack-russia.html.
109 Antonio José Vielma, Vice President-Elect Pence: Trump Expressed “Healthy American Skepticism” About US
Intelligence Conclusions, CNBC (Jan. 4, 2017), at http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/04/vice-president-elect-pence-
trump-expressed-healthy-american-skepticism-about-us-intelligence-conclusions.html.
110 Foreign Cyber Threats Hearing, supra note 35, at 51 (statement of James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of Nat’l
Intelligence). Indeed, as DNI Clapper indicated, intelligence agencies in early January “st[ood] actually more res-
olutely on the strength of th[e] statement that wemade on the 7th of October [attributing the hacks to the Russian
government].” Id. at 31.
111 See Shear & Sanger, supra note 108; see also supra notes 67–72 and corresponding text.
112 The NSA only had “moderate confidence” in this assessment, while the CIA and FBI both had “high con-
fidence.” OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND
INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS 1 (2017), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
3254237/Russia-Hack-Report.pdf.
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• Putin most likely wanted to discredit Secretary Clinton because he has publicly
blamed her since 2011 for inciting mass protests against his regime in late 2011
and early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for comments he almost certainly
saw as disparaging him.
We assess Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for
President-elect Trump over Secretary Clinton.
• Beginning in June, Putin’s public comments about the US presidential race avoided
directly praising President-elect Trump, probably because Kremlin officials thought
that any praise from Putin personally would backfire in the United States.
Nonetheless, Putin publicly indicated a preference for President-elect Trump’s stated
policy to work with Russia, and pro-Kremlin figures spoke highly about what they
saw as his Russia-friendly positions on Syria and Ukraine. Putin publicly contrasted
the President-elect’s approach to Russia with Secretary Clinton’s “aggressive
rhetoric.”
• Moscow also saw the election of President-elect Trump as a way to achieve an inter-
national counterterrorism coalition against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
. . . .
• Putin, Russian officials, and other pro-Kremlin pundits stopped publicly criticizing
the US election process as unfair almost immediately after the election because
Moscow probably assessed it would be counterproductive to building positive rela-
tions.
We assess the influence campaign aspired to help President-elect Trump’s chances of victory when
possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to the President-
elect. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the presidency the
Russian influence campaign focused more on undercutting Secretary Clinton’s legitimacy and crip-
pling her presidency from its start, including by impugning the fairness of the election.
• Before the election, Russian diplomats had publicly denounced the US electoral pro-
cess and were prepared to publicly call into question the validity of the results. Pro-
Kremlin bloggers had prepared a Twitter campaign, #DemocracyRIP, on election
night in anticipation of Secretary Clinton’s victory, judging from their social
media activity.113
The report also addressed the scope of the Russian government’s intrusion into election-
related activities:
We assess Russian intelligence services collected against the US primary campaigns, think tanks,
and lobbying groups they viewed as likely to shape future US policies. In July 2015, Russian intel-
ligence gained access to Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks and maintained that
access until at least June 2016.
• TheGeneral StaffMain IntelligenceDirectorate (GRU)probably began cyber operations
aimed at theUS election byMarch 2016.We assess that the GRU operations resulted in
the compromise of the personal e-mail accounts of Democratic Party officials and polit-
ical figures. By May, the GRU had exfiltrated large volumes of data from the DNC.114
Finally, it detailed the methods that the Russian government used to interfere:
113 Id. at 1–2.
114 Id. at 2.
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We assess with high confidence that the GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, and
WikiLeaks to release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to
media outlets.
• Guccifer 2.0, who claimed to be an independent Romanian hacker, made multiple
contradictory statements and false claims about his likely Russian identity throughout
the election. Press reporting suggests more than one person claiming to be Guccifer
2.0 interacted with journalists.
• Content that we assess was taken from e-mail accounts targeted by the GRU inMarch
2016 appeared on DCLeaks.com starting in June.
We assess with high confidence that the GRU relayed material it acquired from the DNC and
senior Democratic officials to WikiLeaks. Moscow most likely chose WikiLeaks because of its
self-proclaimed reputation for authenticity. Disclosures through WikiLeaks did not contain
any evident forgeries.
• In early September, Putin said publicly it was important the DNC data was exposed
to WikiLeaks, calling the search for the source of the leaks a distraction and denying
Russian “state-level” involvement.115
• The Kremlin’s principal international propaganda outlet RT (formerly Russia Today)
has actively collaborated with WikiLeaks. RT’s editor-in-chief visited WikiLeaks
founder Julian Assange at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London in August 2013,
where they discussed renewing his broadcast contract with RT, according to
Russian and Western media. Russian media subsequently announced that RT had
become “the only Russian media company” to partner with WikiLeaks and had
received access to “new leaks of secret information.” RT routinely gives Assange sym-
pathetic coverage and provides him a platform to denounce the United States.116
The report also indicated that, although “Russian intelligence accessed elements of multi-
ple state or local electoral boards,” the Department of Homeland Security “assesses that the
types of systems we observed Russian actors targeting or compromising are not involved in
vote tallying.”117 Beyond that finding, however, the agencies
did not make an assessment of the impact that Russian activities had on the outcome of the 2016
election. The US Intelligence Community is charged with monitoring and assessing the inten-
tions, capabilities, and actions of foreign actors; it does not analyze US political processes or
US public opinion.118
A significant amount of classified evidence was omitted from the public version of the
report.119 The agencies noted that the declassified report’s “conclusions [we]re identical to
115 [Editors’ note: The report appears to refer to an interview that Putin gave to Bloomberg news. See Interview to
Bloomberg, supra note 25 (“[D]oes it really matter who hacked Mrs. Clinton’s election campaign team database?
Does it? What really matters is the content shown to the community. This is what the discussion should be held
about.”) (quoting President Putin).]
116 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 2–3. The report also detailed how
Russia’s “state-run propaganda machine—comprised of its domestic media apparatus, outlets targeting global
audiences such as RT and Sputnik, and a network of quasi-government trolls—contributed to the influence cam-
paign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences.” See id. at 3.
117 Id. at 3.
118 Id. at i.
119 A media report indicated that the classified report was over fifty pages long. Adam Entous & Greg Miller,
U.S. Intercepts Capture Senior Russian Officials Celebrating Trump Win, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2017), at
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the highly classified assessment, but this document d[id] not include the full supporting infor-
mation, including specific intelligence on key elements of the influence campaign.”120 The
intelligence community “rarely can publicly reveal the full extent of its knowledge or the pre-
cise bases for its assessments, as the release of such information would reveal sensitive sources
or methods and imperil the ability to collect critical foreign intelligence in the future.”121
Russian officials denounced the declassified report. A Kremlin spokesman said that “[t]hese
are baseless allegations substantiated with nothing, done on a rather amateurish, emotional
level.”122 The ForeignMinistry’s spokeswoman added: “If ‘Russian hackers’managed to hack
anything in America, it’s two things: Obama’s brain and, of course, the report itself.”123
After the briefing, President-elect Trump released a brief statement that did not address the
report in any detail. It said, in relevant part:
While Russia, China, other countries, outside groups and people are consistently trying to break
through the cyber infrastructure of our governmental institutions, businesses and organizations
including the D[NC], there was absolutely no effect on the outcome of the election[,] including
the fact that there was no tampering whatsoever with voting machines. There were attempts to
hack the R[NC], but the RNC had strong hacking defenses and the hackers were unsuccessful.124
Nonetheless, a few days later, Trump acknowledged that Russia might have been respon-
sible: “As far as hacking, I think it was Russia, but I think we also get hacked by other coun-
tries and other people.”125
In the wake of new material reported by media outlets after the January 6 briefing, mem-
bers of Congress called for investigation of links between Trump’s campaign and the Russian
government.126 The leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation into
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-intercepts-capture-senior-russian-officials-celebrat
ing-trump-win/2017/01/05/d7099406-d355-11e6-9cb0-54ab630851e8_story.html.
120 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at i. Such intelligence might have
included, among other evidence, communications intercepted by U.S. intelligence agencies in which Russian offi-
cials—including those with knowledge of Russia’s election interference campaign—celebrated Mr. Trump’s elec-
tion. See Entous & Miller, supra note 119.
121 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 112, at 1.




124Donald Trump’s Statement After Intelligence Briefing on Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), at https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/01/06/us/politics/donald-trump-statement-hack-intelligence-briefing.html.
125 NataliaWojcik, MackHogan&Mike Juang, Transcript of President-Elect Trump’s News Conference, CNBC
(Jan. 11, 2017, 1:37 PM), at http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/11/transcript-of-president-elect-donald-j-trumps-
news-conference.html.
126 Karoun Demirjian, Democrats Press FBI to Investigate Trump-Russia Ties, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2017), at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/01/13/democrats-press-fbi-to-investigate-trump-
russia-ties. At the briefing, intelligence officials reportedly also presented President-elect Trump with a brief syn-
opsis of two allegations: (1) that Russian operatives are in possession of compromising personal and financial infor-
mation on him, and (2) that Mr. Trump’s surrogates exchanged information with individuals associated with the
Russian government during the campaign. Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper & Carl Bernstein, Intel Chiefs
Presented Trump with Claims of Russian Efforts to Compromise Him, CNN (Jan. 12, 2017), at http://www.cnn.
com/2017/01/10/politics/donald-trump-intelligence-report-russia/index.html. The synopsis was drawn from a
thirty-five-page dossier of memos written by a former British intelligence operative. See id. President-elect
Trump has firmly denied the allegations. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 10,
2017, 5:19 PM), at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/818990655418617856 (calling reports
“FAKE NEWS - A TOTAL POLITICAL WITCH HUNT!”).
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Russian hacking indicated that they would also investigate those connections.127 In addition,
media reports stated that both law enforcement and intelligence agencies were examining
intercepted communications and financial transactions as part of a broad investigation into
ties between Russian officials and Trump’s campaign associates, including Paul Manafort,
Carter Page, and Roger Stone.128 However, during a closed-door meeting with House lead-
ers, FBI Director Comey reportedly refused to confirm whether the FBI was investigating the
alleged links.129 Similarly, when asked by the Senate Intelligence Committee about an FBI
investigation of possible connections, Mr. Comey said that he “would never comment on
investigations, whether we have one or not, in an open forum like this.”130
The new administration’s National Security Advisor, Lieutenant General Michael
Flynn, resigned on February 13 following allegations that he improperly discussed certain
issues with the Russian Ambassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak, before President
Trump took office.131 The press had previously reported that Gen. Flynn and Mr. Kislyak
spoke on the phone several times on December 29, when President Obama announced
sanctions against Russia for its election interference.132 Then, in early February, U.S.
officials reportedly said that Gen. Flynn’s statements might have suggested that the
Russian government could expect relief from those sanctions, even if his statements did
not convey an explicit promise.133
After these reports emerged, according to President Trump, he “asked for [Gen. Flynn’s]
resignation” because Gen. Flynn “didn’t tell . . . Vice President [Pence] . . . the facts [about his
127 See supra note 74 and corresponding text (noting that investigation would examine “any intelligence regard-
ing links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns”). The House Intelligence
Committee also stated that it would investigate those links. See supra note 76 and corresponding text (describing
same update as Senate Intelligence Committee). Those committees lack the power to compel information disclo-
sure. See Karoun Demirjian, Senate Intel Chiefs Promise Investigation of Trump-Russia Ties as House Democrats
Accuse FBI Director of Stonewalling, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
powerpost/wp/2017/01/13/democrats-accuse-fbi-director-of-stonewalling-on-trump-russia-ties-as-more-call-
for-him-to-step-down (noting limitations of Senate Intelligence Committee). However, they can investigate the
links by examining information already collected by intelligence agencies. Id.
128 See Michael S. Schmidt, Matthew Rosenberg, Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Intercepted Russian
Communications Part of Inquiry into Trump Associates, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/01/19/us/politics/trump-russia-associates-investigation.html; U.S. Inquiries into Russian Election
Hacking Include Three FBI Probes, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2017), at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-rus-
sia-cyber-idUSKBN15X0OE (reporting that the FBI is pursuing at least three separate investigations, including
one into financial transactions by Russian persons believed to have links to Trump’s associates).
129 Demirjian, supra note 127. Following that meeting, some House Democrats even called for Comey’s res-
ignation because they did not believe that he could capably lead any Russian hacking investigation. See id.
130 Russian Intelligence Activities Hearing, supra note 56. Mr. Comey reiterated later in the hearing that “espe-
cially in a public forum, [the FBI] never confirm[s] or den[ies] a pending investigation.” Id.
131 See Maggie Haberman, Matthew Rosenberg, Matt Apuzzo & Glenn Thrush, Michael Flynn Resigns as
National Security Advisor, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/us/politics/don-
ald-trump-national-security-adviser-michael-flynn.html; see also Greg Miller, Adam Entous & Ellen Nakashima,
National Security Adviser Flynn Discussed Sanctions with Russian Ambassador, Despite Denials, Officials Say, WASH.
POST (Feb. 9, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/national-security-adviser-
flynn-discussed-sanctions-with-russian-ambassador-despite-denials-officials-say/2017/02/09/f85b29d6-ee11-
11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html (describing events preceding Mr. Flynn’s resignation).
132 David Ignatius,Why Did Obama Dawdle on Russia’s Hacking?, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2017), at https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-did-obama-dawdle-on-russias-hacking/2017/01/12/75f878a0-d90c-11e6-
9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html.
133 Miller, Entous & Nakashima, supra note 131. Those officials had “access to reports from U.S. intelligence
and law enforcement agencies that routinely monitor the communications of Russian diplomats.” Id.
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discussions with Mr. Kislyak], and then he didn’t remember,” which “just wasn’t acceptable
to me.”134 But he said that Gen. Flynn “didn’t have to [resign], because what he [discussed]
wasn’t wrong.”135 Nonetheless, both congressional intelligence committees indicated that
they would likely examine the nature of Gen. Flynn’s discussions with Mr. Kislyak in the
course of their broader investigations into Russian election interference.136
STATE JURISDICTION AND IMMUNITY
Second Circuit Overturns $655 Million Jury Verdict Against Palestine Liberation Organization
and Palestinian Authority
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.19
In its August 2016 decision in Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a $655 million jury verdict against the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction.1 The plaintiffs were individuals whose family members had been killed in
terrorist attacks that took place in Jerusalem; defendants were alleged to have coordinated and
carried out these attacks.2While theUnited States government took no position on themerits
134 White House Press Release, Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference (Feb. 16, 2017), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/16/remarks-president-trump-press-conference [hereinafter Feb.
16 Press Conference]. Vice President Pence had previously stated, based on his conversations with Gen. Flynn,
that Gen. Flynn and Mr. Kislyak had not discussed the sanctions against Russia at all. See Face the Nation
Transcript January 15, 2017: Pence, Manchin, Gingrich, FACE THE NATION (Jan. 15, 2017, 2:06 PM), at http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcript-january-15-2017-pence-manchin-gingrich; Miller, Entous
& Nakashima, supra note 131. Gen. Flynn later denied ever discussing sanctions with Mr. Kislyak, both to the
FBI and to media outlets, but then stated that he “had no recollection of discussing sanctions, [but] couldn’t be
certain that the topic never came up.” Sari Horwitz & Adam Entous, Flynn in FBI Interview Denied Discussing
Sanctions with Russian Ambassador, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/flynn-in-fbi-interview-denied-discussing-sanctions-with-russian-ambassador/2017/02/16/
e3e1e16a-f3d5-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html.
135 Feb. 16 Press Conference, supra note 134; see also White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press
Secretary Sean Spicer, #12 (Feb. 14, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/14/press-
briefing-press-secretary-sean-spicer-2142017-12 (“The evolving and eroding level of trust as a result of this situa-
tion and a series of other questionable instances is what led the President to ask for General Flynn’s resignation.
Immediately after the Department of Justice notified theWhite House Counsel of the situation, theWhite House
Counsel briefed the President and a small group of senior advisors. TheWhite House Counsel reviewed and deter-
mined that there [wa]s not a legal issue, but rather a trust issue.”).
136 See Karoun Demirjian,House Intelligence Committee Open to Probing Michael Flynn, WASH. POST (Feb. 16,
2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/house-intelligence-committee-open-to-probing-michael-
flynn/2017/02/16/b3d9ea0a-f496-11e6-a9b0-ecee7ce475fc_story.html; Senate Republicans: Intelligence
Committee Will Investigate Flynn Contact with Russia, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2017), at https://www.washington-
post.com/video/national/senate-republicans-intelligence-committee-will-investigate-flynn-contact-with-russia/
2017/02/14/b6f5dad2-f2ed-11e6-9fb1-2d8f3fc9c0ed_video.html. Leaders of the Senate Judiciary Committee
“issued a letter requesting a Justice Department briefing and access to relevant documents concerning Mr.
Flynn’s resignation.” Matt Flegenheimer, Despite Democrats’ Demands, Broad Inquiry on Russia Ties Isn’t
Assured, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/us/politics/trump-russia-
inquiry.html.
1 Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016).
2 Id. at 324–25.
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of the dispute, it filed a Statement of Interest in the district court “[o]n the limited issue of
setting a bond amount in [the] case.”3
Title 18U.S.C. §2333(a) authorizes “any national of the United States injured in his or her
person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism” to “sue therefor in
any appropriate district court of the United States” and to “recover threefold the damages he
or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.” The chief purposes of the
provision were to give federal courts jurisdiction over certain foreign defendants and to make
available the tort principle of vicarious liability in such actions.4
The provision—part of the Antiterrorism Act of 1991 (ATA)5—was enacted in response to
the Southern District of New York’s ruling in the Klinghoffer case, which dealt with a terror
attack on a cruise ship in the Mediterranean Sea.6 Relying on admiralty jurisdiction,7 the dis-
trict court in that case had held that the U.S. plaintiffs stated a cognizable claim against the
PLO.8 Introducing the language that eventually became Section 2333(a), Senator Chuck
Grassley emphasized that, while the court reached the correct result in Klinghoffer, its reliance
on admiralty jurisdiction suggested potential problems for future plaintiffs who suffered harm
on foreign land. “Unfortunately, victims who turn to the common law of tort or Federal statutes,
find it virtually impossible to pursue their claims because of reluctant courts and numerous juris-
dictional hurdles.”9 To allow victims to recover from injuries caused by “terrorist activity . . .
[that] occurred on land in a foreign country,”10 Senator Grassley introduced the provision to
expand federal jurisdictional in such cases. As one State Department official testified:
This bill [the ATA] . . . expands the Klinghoffer opinion. Whereas that opinion rested on the spe-
cial nature of our admiralty laws, this bill will provide general jurisdiction to our Federal courts
and a cause of action for cases in which an American has been injured by an act of terrorism over-
seas. This bill is a welcome addition to our arsenal against terrorists.11
Addressing the ATA’s consistency with international law, the official noted that the ATA
“maintain[s] the status quo as regards sovereign States and their officials.”12 The ATA did
3 Declaration of Antony J. Blinken, attached to the Statement of Interest of the United States of America, at 3,
Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization, No. 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE (S.D.N.Y. 2015). The United
States filed the Statement of Interest in response to the defendants’ Rule 62 Motion to Stay Execution of the
Judgment and to Waive the Bond Requirement. Although the United States did not “express a view on the ulti-
mate merits of defendants’ Rule 62 motion (or any other issue in the case),” the statement included a declaration
from Blinken raising “concerns about the harms that could arise if the Court were to impose a bond that severely
compromised the Palestinian Authority’s (‘PA’) ability to operate as a governmental entity.” Id. at 2, 5.
4 See generally S. REP. 102–342 (1992).
5 Antiterrorism Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992). For examples of other suits relying
on 18 U.S.C. §2333(a), see, e.g., Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais, S.A., 175 F.Supp.3d 3 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding
jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to Section 2333); Linde v. Arab Bank, 384 F.Supp.2d 571 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (similar).
6 Klinghoffer v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 739 F.Supp. 854, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
7 Id. at 858–59.
8 Id. at 867.
9 136 Cong. Rec. 7592 (1990).
10 Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance, at 13, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute,
291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-1969, 01-1970).
11 Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., at 12 (1990) (testimony of U.S. State Dep’t Official Alan Kreczko).
12 Id.
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not authorize a plaintiff to bring a “cause of action for international terrorism . . . against
[sovereign states]” because that would have been “inconsistent with international law.”13
Section 2333(a) was also meant to make applicable the common law tort principle of vicar-
ious liability and abettor liability in suits against foreign terrorism defendants. JosephMorris,
testifying as a former high-ranking attorney at the Department of Justice, explained:
American victims seeking compensation for physical, psychological, and economic injuries natu-
rally turn to the common law of tort. American tort law in general [speaks] quite effectively to the
facts and circumstances of most terrorist actions not involving acts of state by foreign
governments.14
As Morris explained,
[t]he tort law system . . . [attaches vicarious liability] to those who knowingly or negligently make
it possible for some actor grievously to injure somebody else. As Section 2333(a) is drafted, it
brings all of that tort law potential into any of these civil suits.15
In addition to incorporating vicarious liability into the statute, Congress also designed the
ATA to extend liability not only “to defendants who actually commit a tort, but also those
who aid and abet in its commission.”16
The Waldman case involved suits by multiple American families against the PLO and PA
for seven terror attacks that killed or wounded plaintiffs’ family members.17 The plaintiffs
alleged that the perpetrators of the attacks were, directly or indirectly, affiliated with the
PLO and/or the PA.18 Section 2333(a) facilitated the plaintiffs’ lawsuit in two important
ways. First, the plaintiffs relied on the provision’s vicarious liability principle to argue that
the PLO and the PA should be held liable for terror attacks because of their affiliation
with the perpetrators. Second, the plaintiffs relied on the provision to give the federal
court jurisdiction to hear the claim. In response, the defendants argued that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over them violated the Due Process Clause.19
During the course of litigation, the Supreme Court substantially altered its jurisdiction
jurisprudence in the Daimler and Gucci decisions, narrowing the scope of general personal
jurisdiction.20 Before Daimler, courts routinely exercised general jurisdiction over corpora-
tions that engaged in a substantial amount of business in the forum jurisdiction.21 Daimler
restricted the scope of general jurisdiction by limiting it to places where the defendants were
13 Id.
14 Id. at 83 (testimony of Joseph A. Morris).
15 Id. at 136.
16 Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 10, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute,
291 F.3d 1000.
17 First Amended Complaint, Sokolow, 2005 WL 6699189 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2005).
18 Id.
19 SeeDefendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, at 24,
Sokolow, 2015 WL 1231805 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2015).
20 Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *1.
21 See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol.Mining Co., 342U.S. 437, 448–49 (1952) (holding that Ohio’s exercise
of general jurisdiction was consistent with the Due Process Clause); see also Judy M. Cornett & Michael
H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 111–16 (2015).
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essentially “at home”: typically the defendant’s state of incorporation and its principal place of
business.22
Relying on this new precedent, theWaldman defendants moved for summary judgment on
jurisdictional grounds. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that:
Under bothDaimler and Gucci, the PA and PLO’s continuous and systematic business and com-
mercial contacts within the United States are sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdic-
tion . . . . [The] record is therefore insufficient to conclude that either defendant is “at home” in a
particular jurisdiction other than the United States.23
In light of the connections between the defendants and the United States, the district court
ruled that this was just the type of “exceptional case” in which theDaimler Court would have
found general personal jurisdiction.24 Since the requirements for personal jurisdiction were
satisfied, the district court held that it did not violate the defendants’ due process rights by
hearing the case.25 The case later went to trial, and the jury found for the plaintiffs. After the
trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for the amount of $655 million, once
the calculation of actual damages was trebled per the statutory mandate.26
After the jury delivered the verdict in February 2015,27 the defendants filed a motion to
stay the execution of the judgment and waive the bond requirement for appeal.28 (While
defendants must generally post a bond equivalent to the amount of the judgment plus interest
and costs in order to stay the judgment during appeal,29 the district court has discretion to
reduce or even waive the bond requirement.30) During the ensuing proceedings to determine
the bond requirement for appeal, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken attached a dec-
laration to a U.S. Statement of Interest “respectfully [urging] the Court to carefully consider
the impact of its decision on the continued viability of the PA” in light of evidence showing
the PA’s precarious financial situation.31 The declaration warned that an exorbitant bond
could “severely compromise the PA’s ability to operate as a governmental authority,”
which would “undermine several decades of U.S. foreign policy and add a new destabilizing
factor to the region, compromising national security.”32 After receiving the statement,
the district court ordered the judgment to be stayed pending appeal if defendants “post
[ed] a bond or deposit[ed] cash with the Clerk of the Court in the amount of $10 million
22 Id. at 104 (“Daimler further signals that, except for truly exceptional circumstances, a corporation is ‘at home’
only in its states of incorporation and principal place of business.”).
23 Sokolow, 2014 WL 6811395, at *2.
24 Id.
25 See id. at *2 (holding that the district court could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants).
26 Judgment, Sokolow, 2015 WL 10852003 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2015).
27 Jury Verdict Form, Sokolow, No. 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015).
28 Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Stay Execution of the Judgment and to
Waive the Bond Requirement, Sokolow, No. 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2015).
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a), (d).
30 See generally Timothy S. Bishop, Joshua D. Yount & J. Bishop Grewell, Protecting Your Assets During Appeal,
FOR THE DEFENSE (Jan. 2012), available at https://m.mayerbrown.com/Files/News/0baf2446-4081-4788-bf04-
9e76628439bc/Presentation/NewsAttachment/08e3de60-eda9-404b-a503-9f31ba1796a5/12094.pdf.
31 Declaration of Antony J. Blinken, attached to the Statement of Interest of the United States of America, at 3,
Sokolow, No. 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE (Aug. 10, 2015).
32 Id.
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before September 23, 2015, and in the amount of $1 million every thirty (30) days
thereafter.”33
The Second Circuit overturned the jury verdict because it found that the district court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction violated the defendants’ due process rights. Although the
Second Circuit found that “there was a statutory basis pursuant to the ATA for that service
of process,”34 it ultimately concluded that due process had been violated because the court
lacked personal jurisdiction. The Second Circuit explained that the district court’s conclusion
“that it had general jurisdiction over the defendants” relied “on a misreading of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Daimler.”35 As the court reasoned:
Pursuant to Daimler, the question becomes, where are the PA and the PLO “fairly regarded as at
home”? . . . The overwhelming evidence shows that the defendants are “at home” in Palestine,
where they govern. Palestine is the central seat of government for the PA and PLO. The PA’s
authority is limited to theWest Bank and Gaza, and it has no independently operated offices any-
where else. All PA governmental ministries, the Palestinian president, the Parliament, and the
Palestinian security services reside in Palestine.
. . .
The activities of the defendants’ mission in Washington, D.C.—which the district court con-
cluded simultaneously served as an office for the PLO and the PA—were limited to maintaining
an office inWashington, promoting the Palestinian cause in speeches and media appearances, and
retaining a lobbying firm. These contacts with the United States do not render the PA and the
PLO “essentially at home” in the United States.36
Having concluded that “the district court could not properly exercise general personal juris-
diction over the defendants,”37 the Second Circuit then examined whether the district court
could properly exercise specific jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit rejected all the proffered grounds for specific personal jurisdiction,
finding that the defendants’ actions—while “heinous”—“were not sufficiently connected
to the United States to provide specific personal jurisdiction”:
There [was] no basis to conclude that the defendants participated [in the attacks] in the United
States or that their liability for these acts resulted from their actions that did occur in the United
States.
In short, the defendants were [held] liable [at the district court] for tortious activities that
occurred outside the United States and affected United States citizens only because they
were the victims of indiscriminate violence that occurred abroad . . . . A focus on the relation-
ship of the defendants, the forum, and the defendants’ suit-related conduct points to the con-
clusion that there is no specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants for the torts in this
case.38
The court focused on three points in reaching this conclusion. First, the plaintiffs argued that
the court could exercise jurisdiction under the Calder “effects test” because the defendants
engaged in harmful conduct expressly aimed at the United States by supplying resources
33 Order, Sokolow, No. 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2015).
34 Waldman, 835 F.3d at 328.
35 Id. at 332.
36 Id. at 332–33.
37 Id. at 335.
38 Id. at 337.
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to terrorists that killed U.S. citizens in order to influence U.S. foreign policy.39 The court
rejected this argument after determining that the effects on the United States were “fortu-
itous” rather than the result of targeted conduct.40 Second, the plaintiffs argued that “the
defendants purposefully availed themselves of the forum by establishing a continuous pres-
ence in the United States and pressuring United States government policy by conducting ter-
ror attacks in Israel and threatening further terrorism unless Israel withdrew from Gaza and
the West Bank.”41 The court declined to find jurisdiction on this basis, since the defendants’
purposeful contacts were unrelated to the plaintiffs’ particular claims.42 Third, the plaintiffs
argued that the defendants “consented to personal jurisdiction under the ATA by appointing
an agent to accept process.”43 The court dismissed this as a separate issue from the “consti-
tutional question of whether due process is satisfied” by the exercise of personal jurisdiction.44
Since the U.S. courts could not constitutionally exercise general or specific jurisdiction over
the foreign defendants, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the district court and
dismissed the case.45
The Second Circuit’s decision prompted quick reactions from the international commu-
nity. Hanan Ashrawi, a member of the PLO’s executive committee, remarked that the court’s
decision “restore[d] [her] faith in the judicial system.”46 She thought the “American justice
system proved its impartiality.”47 Palestinian Finance Minister Shukri Bishara noted that
“[t]his [was] a Palestinian victory that should not be underestimated[,] and it is a big blow
to anyone who attempts to blackmail us.”48 The reversal of the jury verdict, which Israeli
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman had described as a “moral victory for the State of
Israel and victims of terrorism,”49 disappointed Israeli officials. The plaintiffs’ lawyer called
on Congress and the State Department to intervene to “ensure that [the plaintiffs] are com-
pensated by the PA and PLO for these crimes. . . . This decision must be corrected so that
these families may receive justice.”50
39 Id. at 337–41.
40 Id. at 337.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 341–43.
43 Id. at 343.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 344.
46 Benjamin Weiser, Court Throws Out $655.5 Million Terrorism Verdict Against Palestinian Groups, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/nyregion/appeals-court-terror-verdict-plo-pal-
estinian-authority.html.
47 Id.
48 Jonathan Stempel,U.S. Court Voids $655 Million Verdict Against PLO over Israel Attacks, REUTERS (Aug. 31,
2016), at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-decision-idUSKCN1161UU.
49 Shurat Hadin Israel Law Center, Official Reactions to the Landmark Court Ruling in Sokolow v. Palestinian
Authority (Feb. 25, 2015), at http://israellawcenter.org/pr/official-reactions-to-the-landmark-court-ruling-in-
sokolow-v-palestinian-authority.
50 Nicole Hong, U.S. Appeals Court Dismisses Ruling Against Palestinian Authority, PLO, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31,
2016), at http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-appeals-court-dismisses-ruling-against-palestinian-authority-plo-
1472660849.
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES2017 509
STATE JURISDICTION AND IMMUNITY
New Legislation Seeks to Confirm Immunity of Artwork and Facilitate Cultural Exchange
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.25
On December 16, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Foreign Cultural Exchange
Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act (FCEJICA).1 This act amends the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) in order to confirm the jurisdictional immunity of foreign
states in connection with lending artwork to the United States for temporary exhibit. The
FCEJICA contains two exceptions, described below, that introduce some uncertainty about
the extent of protection the statute provides to foreign states.
The House Judiciary Committee report explained that the legislation was prompted by the
increasingly problematic relationship between the FSIA as recently interpreted by the courts and
the Immunity from Seizure Act (IFSA), which was enacted in 1965 and predates the FSIA:
The Immunity from Seizure Act (IFSA) provides the President, or the President’s designee, with
authority to grant a work of art or other object of cultural significance immunity from seizure by
U.S. courts whenever it is determined that its temporary exhibition or display in the United States
is within our national interest.2 The intent of the IFSA is to encourage the cultural and educational
exchange of artwork and other culturally significant objects which, in the absence of the legisla-
tion, would not be made available for exchange. In enacting IFSA, Congress recognized that cul-
tural exchange can produce substantial benefits to the United States, both artistically and
diplomatically.3
However, for artwork and cultural objects owned by foreign governments, the intent of IFSA is
being frustrated by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Recent court decisions have
interpreted a provision of FSIA in a manner that opens foreign governments up to the jurisdiction
of U.S. courts if foreign government-owned artwork is present in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity and there is a claim that the artwork was taken in violation of inter-
national law.4 Courts have determined that the non-profit exhibition or display of the artwork can
be considered “present in the United States in connection with commercial activity” even if the
artwork has been granted immunity under IFSA.5
The House Judiciary Committee had a particular case in mind: Malewicz v. City of
Amsterdam. Malewicz concerns a dispute between the City of Amsterdam and the
Malewicz family over the ownership of a group of paintings.6 The plaintiffs were descendants
of Kazimir Malewicz, “a world-renowned Russian artist in the years before World War II.”7
Because of unrest in the Soviet Union, Kazimir entrusted some of his paintings to friends in
Germany after displaying them at an exhibit in Berlin in 1927.8 Nearly three decades later,
1 Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 114-319 (2016) [herein-
after FCEJICA]; see also Alyssa Buffenstein, Obama Signs Law that Could Reopen Cultural Exchange with Russia,
ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 5, 2017), at https://news.artnet.com/art-world/obama-signs-law-cultural-exchange-russia-
805304; Ingrid Wuerth, An Art Museum Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, LAWFARE (Jan. 2,
2017, 12:48 PM), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/art-museum-amendment-foreign-sovereign-immunities-act.
2 22 U.S.C. §2459.
3 H.R. REP. No. 89-1070 (1965).
4 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3).
5 H.R. REP. No. 114-141, 2 (2015).
6 Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F.Supp.2d 298, 300 (D.D.C. 2005).
7 Id. at 301.
8 Id.
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afterMalewicz’s death in 1956, the StedelijkMuseum in the City of Amsterdam obtained the
paintings.9 In 2003, the city loaned the paintings to museums in New York and Houston
after obtaining immunity under the IFSA from the State Department.10 The plaintiffs
filed suit for replevin and monetary damages in federal district court while the paintings
were on display in the United States.11 The city moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim because the artwork had been granted immunity under the IFSA.12 The State
Department filed a Statement of Interest cautioning the district court against allowing the
suit to continue: “permitting jurisdiction over a foreign state in such cases threatens to under-
mine significantly the interests that [the IFSA] was designed to foster and to create friction in
U.S. relations with other countries.”13
Despite the State Department’s concerns, the district court ruled that loaning artwork to
museums in the United States could subject foreign states to litigation under the commercial
activity exception to the FSIA.14 Under the FSIA, foreign states are immune from the juris-
diction of U.S. courts unless an enumerated exception applies. The FSIA denies immunity in
any case where “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in con-
nection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.”15 The
district court ruled that all of the elements of the exception were satisfied, and denied the City
of Amsterdam’s claim of immunity under the FSIA.16 Of particular relevance here, the dis-
trict court concluded that lending the artworks constituted commercial activity. With respect
to the concern about undermining the IFSA’s purpose, the district court reasoned that
granting immunity [under the IFSA] and . . . establishing jurisdiction [under the FSIA] for certain
claims against a foreign sovereign are both clear and not inconsistent . . . [b]ecause the Malewicz
Heirs are not seeking judicial seizure of the artworks . . . . Immunity from seizure is not immunity
from suit for a declaration of rights or for damages arising from an alleged conversion if the other
terms for FSIA jurisdiction exist.17
In short, the district court allowed the claim to proceed because the IFSA immunized only
the paintings from seizure; it did not bar claims simply because they related to the paintings.
And since all of the elements of the FSIA expropriation exception were met, the city could not
rely on the sovereign immunity defense.
This ruling chilled international art lending; the Russian government, for example, sus-
pended all art loans into the United States in the aftermath of Malewicz.18 The committee
9 Id. at 301–03.
10 Id. at 303.
11 Id. at 300.
12 Id. at 303.
13 Statement of Interest of the United States at 6, Malewicz, No. 1:04-cv-00024-RMC, available at https://
www.state.gov/s/l/2004/78110.htm.
14 Malewicz, 362 F.Supp.2d at 315–16 (denying the first motion to dismiss); see also Malewicz v. City of
Amsterdam, 517 F.Supp.2d 322, 340 (D.D.C. 2007) (denying the renewed motion to dismiss).
15 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3) (emphasis added).
16 Malewicz, 517 F.Supp.2d at 340.
17 Malewicz, 362 F.Supp.2d at 311–12.
18 Carol Vogel and Clifford J. Levy,Dispute Derails Art Loans from Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2011), at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/arts/design/03museum.html; H.R. REP. No. 114-141, 1–2 (2015) (“This has
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report for the FCEJICA explained the view that decisions likeMalewicz undermined the goals
of the IFSA:
By allowing the presence in the United States of immunized works to form the basis for depriving
foreign states of sovereign immunity, courts have turned IFSA on its head and paved the way for
further lawsuits of the very sort Congress intended to prevent. As one scholar has observed, “[a]
museum promotion or art loan into the United States is not the best mechanism to trap foreign
sovereigns into U.S. courts. It mixes together two separate interests: promoting (by protecting)
cross-cultural art and cultural heritage exchanges, and providing a forum for wronged individuals
to seek justice for their private claims.”
In enacting IFSA, Congress made the policy decision to promote Americans’ exposure to objects
of cultural significance over the potential rights of individual claimants. Congress’ aim was to
ensure that foreign leaders would not be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts when they
loaned immunized cultural objects for temporary exhibits in the United States. As
Representative Byron Rogers explained during floor debate on IFSA, the bill was designed to
assure the foreign lender that it could lend cultural objects to the United States without incurring
the risk that the objects would be seized or the lender would become subject to suit . . . . The
ongoing effectiveness of IFSA to encourage foreign governments to lend cultural objects depends
upon the ability to provide assurance to foreign lenders that participating in an immunized exhibit
will, in fact, protect them from litigation in the United States based on the exhibit.19
With these aims in mind, the FCEJICA amended the FSIA by adding section 1605(h)(1).20
This new section seeks to clarify the definition of “commercial activity” for purposes of the
expropriation exception to the FSIA.21 Specifically, the section provides that activities of a
foreign state associated with the temporary exhibition or display of artwork shall not be con-
sidered to be commercial activity if the following conditions are met:
(A) a work is imported into the United States from any foreign state pursuant to an agreement that
provides for the temporary exhibition or display of such work entered into between a foreign state
that is the owner or custodian of such work and the United States or one or more cultural or edu-
cational institutions within the United States, [and]
(B) the President . . . has determined . . . that such work is of cultural significance and the tem-
porary exhibition or display of such work is in the national interest, and
(C) the notice thereof has been published . . . .22
Because the expropriation exception to the FSIA applies only where the property is “present in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States,”23
the FCEJICA significantly restricts plaintiffs’ access to that exception.
The FCEJICA created two exceptions to the re-extension of sovereign immunity over art-
work loans. First, the statute contained a “Nazi-Era Claims” exception denying foreign states
immunity in litigation concerning art taken between 1933 and 1945 by a government affil-
iated with the Nazi regime.24 The House Report explains: “This exception is included in the
led, in many instances, to foreign governments declining to export artwork and cultural objects to the United
States for temporary exhibition or display.”).
19 HOUSE REP. 114-141 at 6 (citations omitted).
20 FCEJICA, supra note 1.
21 See supra note 15 and corresponding text.
22 28 U.S.C. §1605(h)(1).
23 See supra note 15 and corresponding text.
24 §1605(h)(2)(A).
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bill because of the systematic looting of artwork by the Nazis in Europe during Hitler’s
reign—looting that was ‘on a historically unmatched level.’”25
A second exception was added later in the legislative process. Pursuant to that second
exception, the FCEJICA does not extend immunity to foreign states where a work of art was
“taken [after 1900] in connection with the acts of a foreign government as part of a system-
atic campaign of coercive confiscation or misappropriation of works from members of a
targeted and vulnerable group.”26 This second exception appears intended to address crit-
ics who objected to the act’s singling out of Nazi-era claims. In 2012, after Senators
Feinstein and Hatch introduced legislation nearly identical to that in the FCEJICA but
without the second exception, one international lawyer questioned: “Why are Nazi
storm troopers looting art any different from Bolshevik storm troopers?”27 Marc
Masurovsky, the cofounder of the Holocaust Art Restitution Project, likewise questioned
how Congress could “excuse 28 different kinds of plunder and only outlaw one subset of
one subset.”28 Observing that “the phrase ‘targeted and vulnerable group’ may sweep
broadly to include confiscations allegedly based on political opinion, membership in dis-
favored social groups, or (to borrow from the definition of genocide), in a ‘national, eth-
nical, racial or religious group,’” some commentators noted that the ambiguity of the scope
of the second exception threatened to undermine the asserted goals of the legislation by
failing to “provide much certainty for foreign governments worried about loaning art to U.
S. institutions.”29
INTERNATIONAL OCEANS, ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND AVIATION LAW
United States Confronts China over Seizure of Unmanned Drone in the South China Sea
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.33
On December 15, 2016, China seized an American unmanned underwater vehicle
(UUV) in the South China Sea.1 The drone had been launched by an American naval ves-
sel, the USNS Bowditch. According to press reports, “[t]he American crew was in the pro-
cess of retrieving the device when a small boat dispatched from the Chinese vessel took it as
the American sailors looked on.”2 China has made extensive—and contested—maritime
and territorial claims in the South China Sea, including within an area delimited by the
25 HOUSE REP. 114-141 at 7.
26 §1605(h)(2)(B).
27 Doreen Carvajal,Dispute over Bill on Borrowed Art, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2012), at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/05/22/arts/design/dispute-over-bill-to-protect-art-lent-to-museums.html.
28 Id.
29 Wuerth, supra note 1. Wuerth also points out that, by excluding any explicit requirement for a violation of
international law, this second exception to the FCEJICA “arguably supports the groundbreaking 2016D.C. Circuit
opinion in Simon v. Republic of Hungary . . . [which] held that confiscations of property can themselves constitute
genocide and accordingly violate international law regardless of the nationality of the party from whom the prop-
erty was taken.” Id.
1 Jane Perlez &Matthew Rosenberg, China Agrees to Return Seized Drone, Ending Standoff, Pentagon Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/17/world/asia/china-us-drone.html.
2 Id.
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“nine-dash line.”3 The incident occurred outside of this area,4 and none of the Chinese
government’s statements related to the seizure suggest any assertion of Chinese jurisdic-
tion over the waters where the drone was seized.5 After an exchange of diplomatic state-
ments, China returned the drone to the U.S. Navy.
Neither the United States nor China specified the precise status of the waters in which the
drone was seized under the law of the sea. The location, approximately fifty nautical miles
from a major port in the Philippines’ Subic Bay, appears to be within the Philippines’
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).6 Pursuant to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), states have certain rights of navigation within another state’s EEZ, including free-
dom of scientific research.7 The Pentagon has maintained that the drone was being used to
carry out scientific research, but both American and Chinese experts recognized that the
drone could have been used to gather intelligence on Chinese submarine activity.8 China
declined to comment on this question.9
Regardless of the UUV’s purpose, analysts have argued that China had no legal basis to
seize the UUV because UNCLOS and customary international law relating to sovereign
immunity preclude such seizures.10
Immediately after the drone was seized, the Pentagon called on China to return the drone:
Using appropriate government-to-government channels, the Department of Defense has
called upon China to immediately return an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) that China
unlawfully seized on Dec. 15 in the South China Sea while it was being recovered by a U.S.
Navy oceanographic survey ship. The USNS Bowditch (T-AGS 62) and the UUV—an unclas-
sified “ocean glider” system used around the world to gather military oceanographic data such as
salinity, water temperature, and sound speed—were conducting routine operations in accordance
with international law about 50 nautical miles northwest of Subic Bay, Philippines, when a
Chinese Navy PRC DALANG III-Class ship (ASR-510) launched a small boat and retrieved
3 See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 108 AJIL 331, 331–34 (2014).
4 Perlez & Rosenberg, supra note 1.
5 One commentator pointed out that China might claim that the Bowditch and the UUV were operating inside
China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) because they were operating within two hundred nautical miles of the
Scarborough Shoal. He explained that this “would be a very weak claim” given a recent tribunal decision rejecting
the view that an EEZ could be calculated from the Scarborough Shoal because “the Scarborough Shoal is a rock
that entitles its sovereign to only a 12 nautical mile territorial sea.” Julian Ku, The Nonexistent Legal Basis for
China’s Seizure of the U.S. Navy’s Drone in the South China Sea, LAWFARE (Dec. 16, 2016), at https://www.law-
fareblog.com/nonexistent-legal-basis-chinas-seizure-us-navys-drone-south-china-sea; see also Kristina Daugirdas
& Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 110 AJIL
795 (2016).
6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Art. 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 [hereinafter
UNCLOS] (“The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”).
7 UNCLOS Arts. 58, 87, 245–57.
8 Perlez & Rosenberg, supra note 1.
9 Asked if the drone had been spying in Chinese waters, ForeignMinistry SpokespersonHua Chungying noted:
US military aircraft and vessels have been conducting close-in reconnaissance and military surveys in waters
facing China, posing threat to China’s sovereignty and security. The Chinese side is firmly opposed to that.
As for what the drone was doing at that moment, you’d better raise this question with the US military.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1425479.shtml.
10 UNCLOS Art. 32; Ku, supra note 5.
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the UUV. Bowditch made contact with the PRC Navy ship via bridge-to-bridge radio to request
the return of the UUV. The radio contact was acknowledged by the PRC Navy ship, but the
request was ignored. The UUV is a sovereign immune vessel of the United States. We call
upon China to return our UUV immediately, and to comply with all of its obligations under inter-
national law.11
The next day, before the issue was resolved, then-President-elect Trump suggested he
would take a different approach, tweeting: “China steals United States Navy research
drone in international waters—rips it out of water and takes it to China in unprecedented
act.”12 He followed up: “We should tell China that we don’t want the drone they stole
back.- let them keep it!”13
On December 18, 2016, the Chinese Defense Ministry issued a statement announcing its
intention to return the drone:
Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson Yang Yujun said late Saturday that China has decided to
hand over the U.S. underwater drone it captured in its waters to the United States in an appro-
priate manner. According [to] Yang’s statement on the website of the defense ministry, on the
afternoon of December 15, a Chinese naval lifeboat located an unidentified device in the waters
of the South China Sea. In order to prevent the device from causing harm to the safety of navi-
gation and personnel of passing vessels, the Chinese naval lifeboat verified and examined the
device in a professional and responsible manner. Upon examination, Yang said, the device was
identified as an underwater drone of the United States. The Chinese side has decided to hand
over it to the U.S. in an appropriate manner. Both sides have been maintaining communication
on the issue, Yang noted. The U.S. side’s unilateral move to dramatize the issue in the process is
inappropriate, and not conductive to its settlement. “We regret that,” Yang added. It is worth
emphasizing that for a long time, the U.S. military has frequently dispatched vessels and aircraft
to carry out close-in reconnaissance andmilitary surveys within Chinese waters, Yang said. “China
resolutely opposes these activities, and demands that the U.S. side should stop such activities.
China will continue to be vigilant against the relevant activities on the U.S. side, and will take
necessary measures in response,” said the spokesperson.14
The next day, the State Department confirmed that military-to-military discussions had
resulted in an agreement for the return of the UUV, while maintaining that China’s seizure
of the craft had been in violation of international law:
The device that we’re talking about is—it’s a scientific research device. It’s meant to help us with
oceanographic studies. . . . I don’t know what specifically they had tasked this UUV to do on that
particular day, but it was doing oceanographic work and only oceanographic work. . . . [The
UUV] absolutely was operating inside international waters, and it was absolutely performing nec-
essary scientific research, certainly within the bounds of international law. And the absconding
with it acted against that very international law, which is, again, why we’re going to get it back
. . . . Ambassador Baucus, our ambassador in Beijing, personally was involved in the discussions
11 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Incident in the
South China Sea (Dec. 16, 2016), at https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/
1032611/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-incident-in-south-china-sea.
12 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 17, 2016, 5:57 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/810121703288410112.
13 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 17, 2016, 4:59 PM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/810288321880555520.
14 Ministry of Nat’l Defense of the People’s Republic of China Press Release, China to Hand over Underwater
Drone to U.S. in Appropriate Manner (Dec. 18, 2016), at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2016-12/18/con-
tent_4767099.htm.
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which led to our ability now to get it returned . . . . So yes, we were absolutely engaged right there
at our ambassador’s level.15
That same day, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying fielded questions about the
return of the UUV, stating that the decision had been made “via the military-to-military
channel.”16 She deflected questions about then-President-elect Trump’s comments:
There have been abundant comments from various parties on remarksmade byUS President-elect
Trump on Twitter. I will not add to them. . . . An unidentified device was discovered by a lifeboat
of the Chinese Navy in waters of the South China Sea. In order to prevent this device from posing
danger to the safe navigation of passing ships and personnel, the Chinese side checked and verified
the device in a professional and responsible attitude. After identifying the device as a UUV from
the US, the Chinese side decided to hand it over to the US side in an appropriate manner. It is
learnt that the two sides are in smooth communication through the military-to-military channel,
which will definitely lead to a proper settlement of this issue.17
On December 20, 2016, a Chinese ship returned the UUV to the United States Navy off
the shores of the Philippines near where it was taken.18 The Pentagon was clear in calling the
seizure “unlawful”:
Today, the People’s Liberation Army-Navy vessel 510 returned a U.S. Navy Ocean Glider
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) to the United States, near the location where it had been
unlawfully seized on Dec. 15. USS Mustin (DDG 89) received the vehicle for the U.S. in interna-
tional waters approximately 50 nauticalmiles northwest of Subic Bay. The seizedUUV is a sovereign
immune vessel of theU.S.Navywhichwas conducting routine operations in the international waters
of the South China Sea in full compliance with international law. It had just completed a pre-pro-
grammedmilitary oceanographic survey route and was returning to the nearby USNSBowditch (T-
AGS 62). Ocean Gliders such as this are used regularly by the U.S. Navy and other militaries
throughout the world.
This incident was inconsistent with both international law and standards of professionalism for con-
duct between navies at sea. The U.S. has addressed those facts with the Chinese through the appro-
priate diplomatic andmilitary channels, and [has] called onChinese authorities to comply with their
obligations under international law and to refrain from further efforts to impede lawful U.S. activ-
ities. TheU.S.will continue to investigate the events surrounding this incident and address any addi-
tional findings with the Chinese, as part of our ongoing diplomatic dialogues and the Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement Mechanism.
The U.S. remains committed to upholding the accepted principles and norms of international law
and freedomofnavigation andoverflight andwill continue tofly, sail, andoperate in the SouthChina
Sea wherever international law allows, in the same way that we operate everywhere else around the
world.19
15 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Dec. 19, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/dpb/2016/12/265787.htm.
16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua
Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on December 19, 2016 (Dec. 19, 2016), at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1425479.shtml.
17 Id.
18 Chris Buckley, Chinese Navy Returns Seized Underwater Drone to U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/world/asia/china-returns-us-drone.html.
19 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Return of U.S.
Navy UUV (Dec. 19, 2016), at https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/
1034224/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-return-of-us-navy-uuv.
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The State Department addressed China’s comment that the UUV posed a threat to the
safety of navigation:
First of all, [the UUV] was identified. It’s—I think it says U.S. Navy right on the side of it. I can
check, but I’m pretty sure it does. But there’s no dispute about who it belonged to, and while it
might not bemanned, it was being operated remotely byU.S.Naval personnel and research scientists
on the Bowditch, the ship that—from which it was operating.
So look, . . . while thismight be an interesting discussion to have, it’s kind of a waste of your time and
mine, okay? The UUV belonged to the United States Navy, it was operating in international waters
in accordance with international law, it was doing research—valuable scientific research—there was
no threat to navigation, it was never just off on its own. Imean, it wasn’t like theyweren’tmonitoring
what itwas doing, right? It . . . didn’t decide to just go rogue and . . . become a problem for navigation.
So this is an academic exercise that’s going to be fruitless for both you and me. It belongs to the
United States and we’re glad we have it back, it should never have been taken in the first place,
end of story.20
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
International Criminal Court Prosecutor Recommends Investigation of Potential War Crimes in
Afghanistan, Including Actions by U.S. Military and Central Intelligence Agency
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.4
OnNovember 14, 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) released its annual Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (the Report).1
The Report contained the OTP’s updates on preliminary examinations of several situations,
including in Afghanistan.2 Of particular note, the OTP announced that it had identified a
reasonable basis to seek Pre-Trial Chamber authorization for an investigation into allegations
of war crimes committed by the United States—primarily from 2003 to 2004, but in some
cases as recently as December 2014.3
TheOTP’s examination has focused on the conflict that began in Afghanistan in late 2001.
At that time, a “United States-led coalition launched air strikes and ground operations in
Afghanistan against the Taliban,” eventually ousting that regime from power.4 In May–
June 2002, “a new transitional Afghan government regained sovereignty” and worked to
establish order, aided by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).5 Despite those
efforts, the Taliban regained influence between 2003 and 2005.6 As a result, armed conflict
between Afghan and international military forces and organized armed groups—most
20 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Dec. 20, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/dpb/2016/12/265846.htm.
1 See generally OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIM. CT., REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES
(2016) (Nov. 14, 2016), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf.
2 See id., paras. 17–20.
3 See infra notes 18–21 and corresponding text (describing allegations in more detail).
4 Id., para. 195.
5 Id. The ISAF was established by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1386, and later came under NATO
command. Id.
6 See id., para. 196.
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notably the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin—persisted
throughout the country between May 2005 and December 2014.7
The ICC “may exercise its jurisdiction” over Rome Statute crimes if “[t]he State on the
territory of which the conduct in question occurred” is a party to the statute.8 The ICC there-
fore has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Afghanistan after May 1, 2003, since
Afghanistan did not deposit its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute until
February 10, 2003.9 However, some crimes may have occurred in Poland, Lithuania, and
Romania, as “individuals captured in the context of the armed conflict in Afghanistan,
such as presumed members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda, were allegedly transferred to deten-
tion centres located in those countries.”10 The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed in
Poland and Romania after July 1, 2002, and in Lithuania after August 1, 2003.11
Accordingly, the OTP could examine crimes committed in those countries after those
dates, as long as those crimes were “sufficiently linked to the situation in Afghanistan.”12
The OTP’s Report considered a series of challenges to actions taken by the Taliban, Afghan
government forces, andU.S.military forces. TheOTP “has received 112 communications [from
sources not specified in the Report] pursuant to Article 15 in relation to the situation in
Afghanistan.”13 Before the OTP can ask the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize a full-dress “inves-
tigation,” it must first “determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an inves-
tigation into the situation,”14 taking into account the three factors identified in the Rome
Statute: jurisdiction, admissibility, and the interests of justice.15 If the OTP then files a request
for authorization with the Pre-Trial Chamber, and if the Chamber likewise finds that “there is a
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court,” then it “shall authorize the commencement of the investigation.”16
The OTP Report makes clear that the first step in this process has now taken place.
Specifically, with respect to the United States, the Office determined:
. . . that there is a reasonable basis to believe that, at a minimum, the following crimes within the
[ICC]’s jurisdiction have occurred:
. . .
7 See id.
8 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 12, para. 2(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 [here-
inafter Rome Statute].
9 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 1, para. 193; see also Rome Statute, supra note 8, Art. 126, para. 2
(addressing ratification and entry into force).
10 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 1, paras. 199–200.
11 Id., para. 194.
12 Id., para. 200.
13 Id., para. 192.
14 Id., para. 3; see also Rome Statute, supra note 8, Art. 15(3) (“If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a rea-
sonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for autho-
rization of an investigation, together with any supporting material collected.”).
15 Rome Statute, supra note 8, Art. 53, para. 1(a)–(c). Admissibility requires consideration of two separate fac-
tors. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 1, para. 5. The first, complementarity, “involves an examination of the
existence of relevant national proceedings in relation to the potential cases being considered for investigation by the
[OTP].” Id., para. 6. The second, gravity, “includes an assessment of the scale, nature, manner of commission of
the crimes, and their impact, bearing inmind the potential cases that would likely arise from an investigation of the
situation.” Id., para. 7.
16 Rome Statute, supra note 8, Art. 15(4).
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(c) War crimes of torture and related ill-treatment, by US military forces deployed to
Afghanistan and in secret detention facilities operated by the Central Intelligence Agency,
principally in the 2003–2004 period, although allegedly continuing in some cases until
2014.17
The Report then elaborated on the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction that the U.S. mil-
itary forces might have committed. Discussing crimes committed by Afghan government
authorities, the Report noted that
[m]ultiple sources have reported on the prevalence of torture in Afghan government detention
facilities, including the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, UNAMA, and
a fact-finding commission appointed by the President of Afghanistan in 2013. This conduct
reflects a pattern of alleged criminality . . . for which a state of total impunity persists. At present,
an estimated 35–50% of conflict-related detainees may be subjected to torture in Afghan deten-
tion facilities.18
Regarding U.S. actors, the Report stated:
The information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that, in the course of interrogating
these detainees, and in conduct supporting those interrogations, members of the US armed forces
and the . . . CIA . . . resorted to techniques amounting to the commission of the war crimes of
torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape.
These acts are punishable under articles 8(2)(c)(i) and (ii) and 8(2)(e)(vi)19 of the [Rome] Statute.
Specifically:
• Members of US armed forces appear to have subjected at least 61 detained per-
sons to torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity on the territory of
Afghanistan between 1 May 2003 and 31 December 2014. The majority of the
abuses are alleged to have occurred in 2003–2004.
• Members of the CIA appear to have subjected at least 27 detained persons to
torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity and/or rape on the ter-
ritory of Afghanistan and . . . Poland, Romania and Lithuania . . . between
December 2002 and March 2008. The majority of the abuses are alleged to
have occurred in 2003–2004.
These alleged crimes were not the abuses of a few isolated individuals. Rather, they appear
to have been committed as part of approved interrogation techniques in an attempt to
extract “actionable intelligence” from detainees. According to information available,
the resort to such interrogation techniques was ultimately put to an end by the authorities
concerned, hence the limited time-period during which the crimes allegedly occurred.
The O[TP] considers that there is a reasonable basis to believe these alleged crimes were
committed in furtherance of a policy or policies aimed at eliciting information through
17 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 1, para. 198; see alsoRome Statute, supra note 8, Art. 5, para. 1(b)–(c)
(noting that “[c]rimes against humanity” and “[w]ar crimes” fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction).
18 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 1, para. 208.
19 [Editors’ note: These provisions define “war crimes” to include, respectively, “[v]iolence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture”; “[c]ommitting outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”; and “[c]ommitting rape, sexual slavery, enforced pros-
titution, forced pregnancy, . . . enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a
serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.” Rome Statute, supra note 8, Art. 8,
para. 2(c)(i)–(ii), (e)(vi).]
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the use of interrogation techniques involving cruel or violent methods which would sup-
port US objectives in the conflict in Afghanistan. Likewise, there is a reasonable basis to
believe that all the crimes identified herein have a nexus to the Afghanistan conflict.20
According to the Report, the allegations rose to the level required to satisfy both elements
of admissibility:21
Complementarity: US civilian and military courts can exercise their jurisdiction over conduct that
would constitute a crime within ICC subject-matter jurisdiction (i.e. war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide), when committed abroad by US nationals.
In its most recent response to the Committee Against Torture . . . , the US indicated that “more
than 70 investigations concerning allegations of detainee abuse by military personnel in
Afghanistan conducted by the Department [of Defence] resulted in trial by courts-martial,
close to 200 investigations of detainee abuse resulted in either non-judicial punishment or adverse
administrative action, and many more were investigated and resulted in action at a lower level.”
Specific public information on the incidents and persons forming the subject of those proceedings
is, however, limited. According to the information available, the [OTP] was unable to identify any
individual in the armed services prosecuted by courts martial for the ill-treatment of detainees
within the Court’s temporal and territorial jurisdiction. The vast majority of investigations and
prosecutions relating to detainee ill-treatment were for conduct in Iraq. A small number of court
martial proceedings (7) were for ill-treatment in Afghanistan that took place in 2002.
The Department of Justice conducted a two-year preliminary review (from August 2009 to June
2011) of allegations related to the abuse of detainees in the custody of the . . . CIA . . . , which
reviewed allegations regarding the ill-treatment of 101 detainees. According to the information
available, the scope of this review appears to have been limited to investigating whether any unau-
thorised interrogation techniques were used by CIA interrogators, and if so, whether such conduct
could constitute violations of any applicable criminal statutes. In his public statements about those
proceedings, the US Attorney General further emphasized that “the Department of Justice . . . will
not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance given by
the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees.” As a result of the review, the
Attorney-General conducted full criminal investigations only into the cases of two detainees who
had died in CIA custody. Both investigations were completed in August 2012 and did not result in
any indictments or prosecutions because, according to the Attorney-General, “the admissible evi-
dence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”22
While proceedings appear to have been limited to the conduct of interrogators and to incidents
where interrogation methods were not authorised at the time, the O[TP] is seeking to obtain fur-
ther clarifications on the scope of relevant preliminary reviews and investigations before finalising
its determination on the admissibility of the related potential cases.
Criminal investigations are reportedly on-going in Poland, Romania and Lithuania regarding
alleged crimes committed in relation to the CIA detention facilities on their respective territories.
The information available has not allowed the O[TP] to discern the actual contours of such
national cases, such that their scope could be said to cover the potential cases under the analysis.
Gravity: There is specific information indicating that at least 88 persons in US custody were alleg-
edly tortured. The information available suggests that victims were deliberately subjected to
20 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 1, paras. 211–13.
21 See supra note 15 (discussing complementarity and gravity components of admissibility).
22 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of
Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 30, 2012), at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-closure-investigation-interrogation-certain-detainees (providing more
details about the background and results of the investigation, which was conducted by Assistant U.S. Attorney
John Durham).
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physical and psychological violence, and that crimes were allegedly committed with particular cru-
elty and in a manner that debased the basic human dignity of the victims. The infliction of
“enhanced interrogation techniques,” applied cumulatively and in combination with each
other over a prolonged period of time, would have caused serious physical and psychological injury
to the victims. Some victims reportedly exhibited psychological and behavioural issues, including
hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. The gravity of
the alleged crimes is increased by the fact that they were reportedly committed pursuant to plans or
policies approved at senior levels of the US government, following careful and extensive
deliberations.23
The Report then indicated that “[t]he O[TP] is concluding its assessment of factors set out in
Article 53(1)(a)-(c), and will make a final decision on whether to request the Pre-Trial
Chamber authorisation to commence an investigation into the situation in the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan since 1 May 2003, imminently.”24
TheUnited States’ response to the Report was brief. The day after the release of the Report,
State Department Press Office Director Elizabeth Trudeau stated that the United States “do
[es] not believe that an ICC examination or investigation with respect to the actions of U.S.
personnel in relation to the situation in Afghanistan is warranted or appropriate.”25 She gave
two reasons for this position. First, “the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute and
has not consented to ICC jurisdiction.”26 Second, the United States “ha[s] a robust system of
accountability.”27 It has
supported ICC investigations and prosecution of cases that we believe advance our values in accor-
dance with U.S. law. . . . [B]ut we hold ourselves to the highest possible standards . . . . [W]e
believe that we have national systems of accountability that are more than sufficient.28
Moreover, according to Trudeau, the United States had “extensively examined the conduct of
our own forces in Afghanistan,” and “[i]n many cases, people were held accountable.”29
23 OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 1, paras. 219–24.
24 Id., para. 230.
25 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing by Elizabeth Trudeau (Nov. 15, 2016), at https://
2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/11/264350.htm.
26 Id. Trudeau did not elaborate on the basis for this assertion regarding ICC jurisdiction.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.Worth recalling in this regard is President Obama’s Executive Order 13491, issued on January 22, 2009.
See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. §199 (2009). That order made three primary changes to the United States’
interrogation program. First, it revoked Executive Order 13440, issued by President Bush, which had identified
the acceptable “conditions of confinement and interrogation practices . . . to be used with an alien detainee who
[wa]s determined . . . to be a member or part of or supporting al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated organizations,”
such that “a program of detention and interrogation approved by the Director of the C[IA] [would] fully compl[y]
with the obligations of the United States under Common Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions].” Exec. Order
No. 13,440 §3(b), 3 C.F.R. §229, 230 (2007). Second, the order required:
Consistent with the requirements of the Federal torture statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340–2340A, section 1003 of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 2000dd, the Convention Against Torture [and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 100–20 (1988)], Common Article 3, and other laws regulating the treatment and interrogation of indi-
viduals detained in any armed conflict, such persons shall in all circumstances be treated humanely and shall
not be subjected to violence to life and person (including murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment,
and torture), nor to outrages upon personal dignity (including humiliating and degrading treatment), when-
ever such individuals are in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of
the United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department
or agency of the United States.
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In addition, the United States has entered into bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs) with
numerous countries in order to “ensure that U.S. persons will not be surrendered to the I[CC]
without [the United States’] consent.”30 Of the countries referenced in the Report as possible
locations for U.S. war crimes, only Afghanistan has a BIA with the United States.31 That
agreement states that, “[b]earing in mind Article 98 of the Rome Statute,” among other obli-
gations, “[p]ersons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the
expressed consent of the first Party, be surrendered or transferred by any means to the I
[CC] for any purpose.”32 Article 98(2), in turn, indicates that the ICC
may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent
of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the [ICC], unless the [ICC] can
first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.33
However, the proper interpretation of that provision remains in dispute, and it is unclear how
the BIA with Afghanistan would affect the ICC’s jurisdiction.34
It remains unclear whether any investigation will actually take place. Even after the OTP
determines that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, it must submit a
request to the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization—which, as noted, it has not yet done.35
Exec. Order No. 13,491 §3(a), 3 C.F.R. §199, 200. In addition, the order stated that “an individual in the custody
or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government, or detained
within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed
conflict, shall not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interroga-
tion, that is not authorized by and listed in Army FieldManual 2–22.3.” Id. §3(b), 3 C.F.R. §199, 200–01. Third,
the order indicated that “[t]he CIA shall close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently
operates and shall not operate any such detention facility in the future.” Id. §4(a), 3 C.F.R. §199, 201.
30 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement (May 3, 2005), at https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm.
31 See Resources: Bilateral Immunity Agreement Campaign, AM. NON-GOVERNMENTALORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L
CRIM. CT., at http://www.amicc.org/bilateral-immunity-agreements. That BIA was signed on September 20,
2002, Agreement Regarding the Surrender of Persons to the International Criminal Court, U.S.-Afghanistan,
Aug. 23, 2003, Temp. State Dep’t No. 03-119, KAV 6308, available at https://www.state.gov/documents/orga-
nization/183325.pdf [hereinafter Afghanistan BIA], and it is still in force, see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN
FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY
1, 2016 2, available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/267489.pdf. The United States also exe-
cuted a BIA with Romania on August 1, 2002. Philip T. Reeker, Press Statement,U.S. and Romania Sign Article 98
Agreement, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Aug. 1, 2002), at https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/12393.htm.
However, it appears that the United States does not currently view that BIA as being in force. See U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE, supra, at 370–73 (listing agreements in force with Romania).
32 Afghanistan BIA, supra note 31, at 1.
33 Rome Statute, supra note 8, Art. 98, para. 2; see also id. Art. 89, para. 1 (“States Parties shall, in accordance
with the provisions of . . . Part [IX of the Statute] and the procedure under their national law, comply with requests
for arrest and surrender.”).
34 See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 108 AJIL 547, 549–50 (2014) (summarizing background and criticism of United States’
use of BIAs); see also EMILY C. BARBOUR & MATTHEW C. WEED, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC):
JURISDICTION, EXTRADITION, AND U.S. POLICY 7–10 (Mar. 16, 2010), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R41116.pdf (discussing possible effects of BIAs with respect to Rome Statute provisions).
35 See Rome Statute, supra note 8, Art. 15, paras. 3–4. The Pre-Trial Chamber applies the same factors as the
OTP in deciding whether to authorize the investigation. It has interpreted the reasonable basis standard to require
“a sensible or reasonable justification for a belief that a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court ‘has been
or is being committed.’” Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19-Corr, Decision Pursuant to
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of
Kenya, para. 35 (Mar. 31, 2010).
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The Chamber has approved all three previous investigative requests from the OTP, regarding
situations in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, and Georgia.36 However, the Chamber’s review can take
several months, and the judges might request more information from theOTP before making
a decision.37 Neither the ICC nor the OTP have made any indications since the Report was
released that an investigation of the situation in Afghanistan is forthcoming.
USE OF FORCE AND ARMS CONTROL
United States Strikes Houthi-Controlled Facilities in Yemen, Reaffirms Limited Support for
Saudi-Led Coalition Notwithstanding Growing Concerns About Civilian Casualties
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.26
SinceMarch 2015, the United States has supported a Saudi-ledmilitary coalition fighting a
Houthi insurgency that seized control of Yemen’s capital and governmental institutions in
2014.1 At the request of ousted Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the Saudi-
led coalition launched an air campaign in Yemen to “defend Saudi Arabia’s border and to
protect Yemen’s legitimate government.”2 To support these efforts, President Obama autho-
rized the “provision of logistical and intelligence support to [coalition] military operations”
and the establishment of a “Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia to coordinate U.S. military
and intelligence support.”3 The United States has disclaimed any direct offensive role in the
conflict4 while acknowledging that it has provided support by refueling coalition warplanes,5
supplying targeting intelligence,6 and sending U.S. military personnel to assist the planners of
the coalition’s air campaign.7
36 David Bosco, Exclusive: International Criminal Court Poised to Open Investigation into War Crimes in
Afghanistan, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 31, 2016), at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/31/exclusive-international-
criminal-court-poised-to-open-investigation-into-war-crimes-in-afghanistan/.
37 Id.
1 U.S. Dep’t of State, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Yemen (Feb. 2, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/35836.htm.
2 White House Press Release, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen
(Mar. 25, 2015), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokes-
person-bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen.
3 Id.
4 Id. (stating that “U.S. forces are not taking direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort”).
5 E.g.,MatthewRosenberg&MarkMazzetti,U.S. Ship off Yemen Fires Missiles at Houthi Rebel Sites, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 12, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/world/middleeast/yemen-rebels-missile-warship.html
(reporting that, as of October 2016, the U.S. military had “refueled more than 5,700 aircraft involved in the
[Saudi-led] campaign”).
6 E.g., Missy Ryan, Civilian Casualties in Yemen Bring Charges of U.S. Responsibility for Saudi Actions, WASH.
POST (Oct. 3, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/civilian-casualties-in-yemen-
bring-charges-of-us-responsibility-for-saudi-actions/2016/10/03/29a9b606-864d-11e6-ac72-a29979381495_
story.html (reporting that the Pentagon provided the Saudi military lists of “no-strike” locations, including civilian
targets and infrastructure).
7 E.g., Robert Wall, U.S. Military Working to Prevent Weapons Shortfall in Islamic State, Yemen Strikes, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2015), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-working-to-prevent-weapons-shortfall-in-
islamic-state-yemen-strikes-1447143660 (reporting a November 2015 statement by a commander of the U.S.
Air Force Central Command that the U.S. military had a small detachment of personnel helping coordinate activ-
ities in the Saudi Arabian center planning air strikes).
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On October 12, 2016, however, the United States engaged in a more direct way: U.S.
Armed Forces conducted missile strikes that destroyed three Houthi radar facilities on the
Yemeni coast.8 The strikes were carried out in response to a launch of anti-ship cruise missiles—
apparently by the Houthis—into international waters patrolled by the U.S. Navy.9 The attack
marked the first direct U.S. military action against the Houthi rebels, as opposed to the suppor-
tive role it has played in the Saudi-led campaign to reinstate Yemen’s deposed government.10
Given this new posture, the U.S. strikes raise questions about domestic and international legal
authorization for such use of force, and about the United States’ role in the broader conflict
between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition.
Then-President Obama authorized the October strikes at the recommendation of former
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Joseph
Dunford.11 Obama notified Congress of the military action on October 14, 2016, pursuant
to the War Powers Resolution (WPR).12 Obama invoked his “constitutional authority to
conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive” to justify
the strikes as a matter of U.S. domestic law.13 He also expressed “appreciat[ion for] the sup-
port of the Congress in this action,”14 implicitly acknowledging the lack of express statutory
authorization for the attacks.15
Obama’s WPR letter explained the administration’s justification for the strikes in terms of
international law. It read:
I directed these strikes in response to anti-ship cruise missile launches perpetrated by Houthi
insurgents that threatened U.S. Navy warships in the international waters of the Red Sea on
October 9 and October 12. The targeted radar facilities were involved in the October 9 launches
and other recent attacks. These limited and proportionate strikes were conducted to protect our
personnel and our ships and will preserve our freedom of navigation in this important maritime
passageway. The United States stands ready to take action in self-defense, as necessary and appro-
priate, to address further threats.16




10 See Zachary Burdette, Today’s Headlines and Commentary, LAWFARE (Oct. 13, 2016), at https://www.lawfar-
eblog.com/todays-headlines-and-commentary-1166.
11 U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on U.S. Military
Strikes Against Radar Sites in Yemen (Oct. 12, 2016), at https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-
Release-View/Article/972169/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-us-military-strikes-against.
12 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
13 WPR Letter, supra note 8.
14 Id.
15 This was not the first time former President Obama relied on his Article II powers to justify the use of military
force abroad. See, e.g., Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States,
110 AJIL 587, 590 (2016) (discussing the administration’s invocation of “unit self-defense”—grounded in the
president’s Article II authority as Commander in Chief—to justify air strikes in Somalia); Kristina Daugirdas
& Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 174, 206–07 (2015) (quoting
a WPR letter by Obama, justifying air strikes against the Islamic State based on the president’s “constitutional
authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and [authority] as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive”);
John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 105 AJIL 568, 574 (2011) (discussing President
Obama’s reliance on Article II powers to justify U.S. military actions in Libya).
16 WPR Letter, supra note 8.
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW524 Vol. 111:2
The “recent attacks”Obama referred to began onOctober 9, when two cruise missiles were
launched from Yemen at the USSMason and the USS Ponce in international waters near the
Bab al-Mandeb strait, a heavily trafficked waterway between Yemen and Djibouti.17 On
October 12, at least one more missile was fired at the USS Mason from Houthi-controlled
territory near the coastal city of Hudaydah.18 Although none of the missiles reached their
apparent U.S. targets, the USS Mason “employed defensive countermeasures.”19 The
Houthis reportedly denied responsibility for the October 9 and October 12 attacks,20 but
a senior administration official expressed “no doubt that the Houthis launched those missiles
at our ships.”21
When asked about the extent of the threat posed, the same U.S. official explained that “it
may not have been the first time that our ships had been targeted,” apparently referring to an
October 1 Houthi attack that damaged an Emirati vessel that had previously been part of the
U.S. Navy.22 “[A]ll of this combined,” said the official, “represents an uptick in Houthi
aggression on the maritime front. And given . . . the volume of shipping and the presence
of our own ships which are in that area, we did regard it as a threat to the point where a
firm response was necessary.”23
The administration emphasized the limited nature of the strikes as directly responsive to
specific provocations by Houthi insurgents. Peter Cook, the Pentagon spokesman, explained
that “[t]hese targets were chosen based on our assessment that they were involved in missile
launches in recent days. And they were struck in order to defend our ships and their crews and
to protect freedom of navigation through a waterway that is vitally important to international
commerce.”24 Cook described the Bab al-Mandeb strait as a “vital link connecting Asia and
Europe,” noting that four million barrels of oil pass through it each day.25 A senior admin-
istration official similarly characterized the U.S. action as a “very specific and targeted strike”
against radar sites used in prior Houthi attacks, such that “the response was appropriate in
both scope and immediacy.”26 The official later added, “we also have a responsibility in terms
17 SeeU.S. Dep’t of Defense News, USSMasonResponds toMissile Threat off Yemen’s Coast (Oct. 12, 2016),
at https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/971904/uss-mason-responds-to-missile-threat-off-yemens-
coast; Dan Lamothe, Navy Launches Tomahawk Missiles at Rebel Sites in Yemen After Attacks on U.S. Ships,
WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/10/12/more-mis-
siles-fired-from-rebel-held-territory-in-yemen-at-u-s-navy-ships.
18 U.S. Dep’t of Defense News, supra note 17.
19 Id.
20 Yemen Denies Targeting U.S. Warship, SABA NEWS AGENCY (Yemen) (Oct. 13, 2016), at https://www.saba-
news.net/en/news443542.htm (quoting a Houthi military official for the allegation that “[t]hese allegations are
unfounded and the army as well [as] popular forces have nothing to do with this action”).
21 U.S. Dep’t of State Special Briefing, Senior Administration Officials on Yemen (Oct. 14, 2016), at https://
2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/263158.htm.
22 Id.; see also Lamothe, supra note 17. For the Houthis’ asserted responsibility for the October 1 attack, see
Army Destroys UAE Warship off Mocha Coast, SABA NEWS AGENCY (Yemen) (Oct. 1, 2016), at https://www.saba-
news.net/en/news442035.htm.
23 U.S. Dep’t of State Special Briefing, supra note 21.
24 U.S. Dep’t of Defense News Transcript, Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary




26 U.S. Dep’t of State Special Briefing, supra note 21.
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of maritime shipping [in] a very, very heavily used waterway, with some many thousands of
ships that traverse this area on a yearly basis involving many countries.”27
Although the administration’s initial references to self-defense suggested reliance on Article 51
of the UN Charter,28 the United States promptly clarified that it acted with the consent of the
Yemeni Government. In an October 15, 2016, letter to the UN Security Council, Samantha
Power, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, explained the U.S. strikes as follows:
These actions were taken with the consent of the Government of Yemen. Although the United
States therefore does not believe notification pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations is necessary in these circumstances, the United States nevertheless wishes to inform the
Council that these actions were taken consistent with international law.29
The United States did not provide any more detail about the nature of the consent
obtained. As explained in prior White House statements and confirmed in its December
2016 Report on the Legal Frameworks Guiding the Use of Force, the United States had pre-
viously obtained consent from the Yemeni Government to carry out counterterrorism oper-
ations against Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and to support Saudi-led coalition
military operations against Houthi insurgents in Yemen.30 However, direct U.S. strikes
27 Id. Although this point has not been discussed in relation to these strikes, the United States has in the past
relied on the customary international law right of transit passage to navigate international straits like the Bab al-
Mandeb. See, e.g., Bureau of Oceans & Int’l Envtl. & Sci. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 112, Limits in the Seas:
United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims 65–67 (Mar. 9, 1992), at https://2009-2017.
state.gov/documents/organization/58381.pdf (citing Diplomatic Note No. 449, Oct. 6, 1986 from the
American Embassy at Sanaa) (“[T]he Government of the Yemen Arab Republic may not legally condition the
exercise of the right of transit passage through or over an international strait, such as Bab-el-Mandeb, upon obtain-
ing prior permission. Transit passages is a right that may be exercised by ships of all nations . . . .”). According to the
UNConvention on the Law of the Sea, ships exercising the right of transit passage shall “refrain from any threat or
use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait” and
shall “refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of . . . transit unless rendered
necessary by force majeure or by distress.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 39, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 UNTS 397. Though not party to the Convention, the United States has claimed that the “normal
mode” of transit for warships exercising their right of transit passage includes activities consistent with the security
of their forces. Bureau of Oceans & Int’l Envtl. & Sci. Affairs, supra at 65.
28 UN Charter, Art. 2(4), 51 (allowing limited use of force in another state’s territory based on the “inherent
right” of self-defense).
29 Letter dated 15 October 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2016/869 (Oct. 15, 2016) [here-
inafter Letter from Samantha Power].
30 White House Press Release, supra note 2; REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE
UNITED STATES’USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 18 (Dec. 2016), available
at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3232529-Framework-Report-Final.html#document/p4 [herein-
after REPORT GUIDING THE USE OF FORCE] (stating that “U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition . . . is being pro-
vided in the context of the Coalition’s military operations being undertaken in response to the Government of
Yemen’s request for assistance, including military support, to protect the sovereignty, peace, and security of
Yemen”). Claims about Yemen’s consent are complicated by the fact that the constitutionally elected president,
President Abdo RabboMansour Hadi, was exiled in 2014 after the Houthi rebels and loyalists to former President
Ali Abdullah Saleh seized the capital city of Sana’a. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Yemen (Apr. 13, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2015/nea/252955.htm; see also
Alex Moorehead, Yemen’s Consent for U.S. Counterterrorism Operations: Questions for the Trump Administration,
JUST SECURITY (Feb. 9, 2017), at https://www.justsecurity.org/37530/yemens-consent-u-s-counterterrorism-oper-
ations-questions-trump-administration (discussing the uncertainty about the legal validity of consent by the Hadi
administration). The United States has not publicly questioned the legitimacy of the exiled government’s consent,
though the recent White House Report acknowledged general challenges in seeking consent from “countries
where governments are rapidly changing [or] have lost control of significant parts of their territory. . . .” See
REPORT GUIDING THE USE OF FORCE, supra at 30.
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against Houthi insurgents—independent from the United States’ support for the Saudi-led
forces—likely required additional consent from the Government of Yemen, which appears to
have been granted.31
The Obama administration was careful to circumscribe the October 12 strikes as separate
from the broader war in Yemen. According to a senior administration official, the U.S. gov-
ernment was “very clear that this was not meant to indicate support for coalition operations
either in Yemen writ large or on the Red Sea. And [it] also made clear in public statements that
[the United States was] not intending to be brought into the war in . . . any fashion.”32 The
Pentagon spokesperson echoed this stance, affirming that “these strikes are not connected to
the broader conflict in Yemen” and that “[t]he United States continues to encourage all par-
ties in the Yemen conflict to commit to a cessation of hostilities and to seek a political solution
to that conflict.”33
Notwithstanding its care to limit the scope of its military action, the U.S. administration
recognized the perceived relation between the October 12 strikes and the United States’ role
in the greater conflict. As one senior official put it:
[T]hese particular strikes . . . sort of bring up to the present more than a year of activity by the
Saudi-led coalition in Yemen which has had a number of unfortunate consequences which we
have talked about publicly: one, our discomfiture with the way that the war has dragged out,
the loss of life; and number two, particularly the civilian casualties. And so that’s been sort of
an underpinning . . . of this conflict.34
The official also acknowledged that the Houthis “could manipulate this [U.S. attack] in all
kinds of different ways . . . .”35 Indeed, a Houthi news agency described the U.S. allegations of
Houthi provocation as “false justifications to pave the way for [the] Saudi-led coalition to
escalate their aggressi[ve] attacks against Yemen . . . .”36 To preempt similar conclusions
by the international community, the United States “underscore[d its] public messages with
private messages to various partners and actors in the region,” emphasizing that it was “serious
in terms of responding when provoked, but also that [this was] a very limited and very par-
ticular, very focused response.”37 The message of the U.S. official was clear: the United States
is “not getting [involved] in the war,” is “not joining the coalition,” and is “continu[ing] to
focus on . . . a ceasefire.”38
While its October 12 attacks apparently struck “in remote areas where there was little risk
of civilian casualties,”39 the United States has acknowledged the high number of civilian casu-
alties resulting from attacks by the Saudi-led coalition it supports.
Prior to the October 12 attack, the United States had scaled back its support of the Saudi-
led coalition due to increasing concerns about civilian casualties. According to the UN High
31 See Letter from Samantha Power, supra note 29.
32 U.S. Dep’t of State Special Briefing, supra note 21.
33 U.S. Dep’t of Defense News Transcript, supra note 24.
34 U.S. Dep’t of State Special Briefing, supra note 21.
35 Id.
36 Yemen Denies Targeting U.S. Warship, SABA NEWS AGENCY (Yemen) (Oct. 13, 2016), at https://www.saba-
news.net/en/news443542.htm.
37 U.S. Dep’t of State Special Briefing, supra note 21.
38 Id.
39 Lamothe, supra note 17.
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Commissioner for Human Rights, by October 10, 2016, more than four thousand civilians
had been killed since the Saudi-led coalition entered the war in Yemen.40 The High
Commissioner singled out as “outrageous” airstrikes on a community hall where a funeral
was being held.41 The High Commissioner protested any continued support of the coalition,
asserting that “[s]ince the beginning of this conflict . . . , weddings, marketplaces, hospitals,
schools—and now mourners at a funeral—have been hit, resulting in massive civilian casu-
alties and zero accountability for those responsible.”42 Human Rights Watch (HRW) labeled
the funeral attack “an apparent war crime” and identified a munition used in the strikes as a
U.S.-made bomb.43
In response to the funeral attack, the White House issued the following statement:
We are deeply disturbed by reports of today’s airstrike on a funeral hall in Yemen, which, if con-
firmed, would continue the troubling series of attacks striking Yemeni civilians. U.S. security
cooperation with Saudi Arabia is not a blank check. Even as we assist Saudi Arabia regarding
the defense of their territorial integrity, we have and will continue to express our serious concerns
about the conflict in Yemen and how it has been waged. In light of this and other recent incidents,
we have initiated an immediate review of our already significantly reduced support to the
Saudi-led Coalition and are prepared to adjust our support so as to better align with U.S.
principles, values and interests, including achieving an immediate and durable end to Yemen’s
tragic conflict. We call upon the Saudi-led Coalition, the Yemeni government, the Houthis
and the Saleh-aligned forces to commit publicly to an immediate cessation of hostilities and
implement this cessation . . . .44
The Saudi-led coalition initially denied responsibility for the strikes,45 but soon after the
White House’s response, Saudi Arabia sent a letter to the UN Security Council expressing its
“deep[] regrets” about the attack, committing to an immediate investigation, and affirming its
“full respect for . . . and compliance with international humanitarian law and international
human rights law.”46 Within a week, the Saudi-led Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT)
released the results of its investigation, which found that coalition aircraft had “wrongly tar-
geted the location, resulting in civilian deaths and injuries” due to “the issuing of incorrect
information.”47 It concluded that “appropriate action . . . must be taken against those who
caused the incident, and that compensation must be offered to the families of the victims.”48
40 UN Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, Outrageous Attack on Funeral Makes International




43 Yemen: Saudi-Led Funeral Attack Apparent War Crime: Credible International Investigation Urgently Needed,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 13, 2016), at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/13/yemen-saudi-led-funeral-
attack-apparent-war-crime.
44White House Press Release, Statement by NSC SpokespersonNed Price on Yemen (Oct. 8, 2016), at https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/08/statement-nsc-spokesperson-ned-price-yemen.
45 See Coalition to Probe Yemen Raid that Killed 140, AL ARABIYA (Saudi Arabia) (Oct. 9, 2016), at https://
english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/10/08/Saudi-denies-Yemeni-funeral-bombing.html (quoting
coalition sources denying involvement).
46 Letter from Abdallah Al-Mouallimi, Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, to the
President of the United Nations Security Council (Oct. 11, 2016), UN Doc. S/2016/850 [hereinafter Saudi
Letter to UN].
47 Press Statement by the Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) on the Great Hall Incident in Sana’a, SAUDI PRESS
AGENCY (Oct. 15, 2016), at http://www.spa.gov.sa/1548647.
48 Id.
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Multiple human rights groups have challenged the credibility of JIAT’s investigations and the
coalition’s willingness to implement its recommendations.49
Since announcing its top-to-bottom review of its coalition support in October, the United
States has taken steps to limit the scope of such assistance and to advance a peaceful resolution
to the Yemen conflict. The Obama administration encouraged and welcomed temporary
cease-fires between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition in October and November,50
though none of them gave way to lasting peace. The coalition continued conducting air
strikes in Yemen, many of which allegedly struck civilian targets and infrastructure.51 For
instance, in late October the coalition struck a Yemeni compound, reportedly killing more
than forty men being held as prisoners.52 Human rights groups questioned the lawfulness of
the attack,53 but the coalition insisted that the compound was used as a “command and con-
trol center for [Houthi] military operations” and that “targeting protocols and procedures
were followed fully.”54
Bymid-December 2016, the administration’s review gave rise to interim adjustments in its
strategy for assisting the Saudi-led coalition. According to press reports, the United States
decided to decrease the number of personnel working with the coalition in Riyadh.55 It
did not, however, curtail its refueling of Saudi warplanes.56 In a White House press briefing,
Press Secretary Josh Earnest summarized the administration’s updated position:
49 See, e.g., Amnesty International Response to the Saudi Arabia-Led Coalition’s Investigations, AMNESTY INT’L
(Jan. 16, 2017), at https://www.amnesty.nl/actueel/amnesty-international-response-saudi-arabia-led-coalitions-
investigations; Letter to Saudi-Led Coalition Joint Incidents Assessment Team Regarding Yemen Investigations,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 13, 2017), at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/16/letter-saudi-led-coalition-
joint-incidents-assessment-team-regarding-yemen. For JIAT’s findings on other challenged coalition attacks,
see Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) on Yemen Responds to Claims on Coalition Forces’ Violations in
Decisive Storm Operations, SAUDI PRESS AGENCY (Aug. 5, 2016), at http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?
lang=en&newsid=1524799.
50 See U.S. Dep’t of State Press Statement, Announcement of Cessation of Hostilities in Yemen (Oct. 18,
2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/10/263252.htm (welcoming a seventy-two-hour
cease-fire beginning on October 19, 2016); U.S. Dep’t of State Press Statement, On the Cessation of
Hostilities in Yemen (Nov. 20, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/11/264466.htm
(welcoming the renewal of a forty-eight-hour cease-fire that began on November 19, 2016).
51 E.g., Ben Hubbard,U.S. Fingerprints on Attacks Obliterating Yemen’s Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2016),
at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/14/world/middleeast/yemen-saudi-bombing-houthis-hunger.html (enu-
merating various civilian targets attacked by the coalition—including hospitals, schools, bridges, power stations,
poultry farms, seaports, factories, weddings, and funerals—and concluding that “hitting Yemen’s economy is part
of the coalition’s strategy”); Bombing Businesses: Saudi Coalition Airstrikes on Yemen’s Civilian Economic Structures,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 10, 2016), at https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/10/bombing-businesses/saudi-
coalition-airstrikes-yemens-civilian-economic-structures (documenting attacks on “civilian economic structures”
from March 2015 through February 2016).
52 BenHubbard, Airstrikes by Saudi-Led Coalition Kill Dozens inWestern Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2016), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/world/middleeast/airstrikes-kill-dozens-in-western-yemen.html; Sudarsan
Raghavan, Airstrikes Kill More Than 40 and Wound Scores in Yemeni Port City, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2016), at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/airstrikes-kill-more-than-40-and-wound-scores-in-yemeni-port-city/2016/
10/30/4666dbfd-afa3-4f8f-9542-7ad77664d4ee_story.html.
53 E.g., Yemen: US-Made Bombs Used in Unlawful Airstrikes, HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH (Dec. 8, 2016), at https://
www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/08/yemen-us-made-bombs-used-unlawful-airstrikes.
54 Raghavan, supra note 52.
55 Missy Ryan, With Small Changes, U.S. Maintains Military Aid to Saudi Arabia Despite Rebukes over Yemen
Carnage, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/12/13/
with-small-changes-u-s-maintains-military-aid-to-saudi-arabia-despite-rebukes-over-yemen-carnage.
56 Id.
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Th[e] review is ongoing, but there are a couple of steps that the United States is prepared to take to
change some of the assistance that we provide.
That includes refocusing our efforts to support the Saudis when it comes to enhancing their bor-
der security and their territorial integrity. The concerns that the Saudis have expressed, which is
entirely legitimate, is that you have an organization that has overthrown the government of Yemen
and has menaced Saudi Arabia, on a number of occasions even breaching their borders. . . . And so
we are going to focus our efforts on helping the Saudis protect their border. We are also going to
undertake steps to refocus our information-sharing and the responsibilities of our personnel in
Saudi Arabia to be focused on this effort.57
That same day, the United States reportedly blocked a sale of precision munitions to Saudi
Arabia, valued at over $350 million.58 That decision echoed a May 2016 determination to
suspend all cluster-munitions sales to Saudi Arabia given the danger those weapons posed to
civilians.59 The December decision did not satisfy human rights groups that had long called
for a complete suspension of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia.60 Other sales made clear that the
United States was not halting the transfer of all military equipment to Saudi Arabia.61 And
U.S. members of Congress had even tried and failed to block similar arms sales to the
Kingdom earlier in the year.62
The sale of U.S. munitions and other forms of U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition have
been controversial since the Saudis entered the war in Yemen. Human rights groups and
international law scholars have debated whether various kinds of U.S. assistance might
impose liability on the United States for legal violations by the coalition. According to
HRW, the United States qualifies as “a party to the conflict in Yemen” given its provision
of targeting intelligence and refueling of planes during bombing raids.63 With respect to
munitions, HRW has found remnants of U.S.-supplied weapons at twenty-three allegedly
unlawful coalition air strikes, including the October funeral attack, and claims that “the
repeated use of US-manufactured munitions in unlawful attacks could make the US
57 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Special Envoy for the Global
Coalition to Counter ISIL, Brett McGurk (Dec. 13, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/12/13/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-and-special-envoy-global.
58 Helene Cooper,U.S. Blocks Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia Amid Concerns over Yemen War, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13,
2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/saudi-arabia-arms-sale-yemen-war.html. When
asked for details, a State Department spokesman refused to discuss pending arms sales. U.S. Dep’t of State
Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Dec. 13, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/12/
265200.htm.
59 John Hudson, Exclusive: White House Blocks Transfer of Cluster Bombs to Saudi Arabia, FOREIGN POLICY (May
27, 2016), at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/27/exclusive-white-house-blocks-transfer-of-cluster-bombs-to-
saudi-arabia/.
60 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 58 (“The absence of a more comprehensive ban, given the ongoing unlawful
strikes and the potential U.S. complicity, is deeply concerning.”) (quoting the Washington director of Human
Rights Watch).
61 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Dec. 9, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/dpb/2016/12/265016.htm (confirming approval of military sales to Saudi Arabia worth $3.5 billion, mostly
for Chinook helicopters not intended for combat roles).
62 See H.R.J. Res. 98, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 32, 114th Cong. (2016).
63 Letter from Sarah Margon, Washington Director of Human Rights Watch, to Barack Obama, President of
the United States (Oct. 31, 2016), available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/
review_of_the_armed_conflict_in_yemen_letter_to_president_obama_english.pdf [hereinafter HRW Letter];
Yemen: US-Made Bombs Used in Unlawful Airstrikes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 8, 2016), at https://www.
hrw.org/news/2016/12/08/yemen-us-made-bombs-used-unlawful-airstrikes.
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complicit for future transfers of arms to Saudi forces.”64 The senators who spearheaded the
2016 resolutions to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia have also criticized the United States’
lack of oversight over its military support for the Saudi-led coalition.65
When asked about HRW’s claims, a State Department spokesperson acknowledged the
administration’s concern with the Saudis’ “particular targeting . . . inaccuracies that put civil-
ians clearly at great risk,” but emphasized that the “cooperation [it] provide[s] to Saudi Arabia
does not include . . . target selection or review. And . . . none of it constitutes endorsement of
offensive operations in Yemen that have harmed civilians.”66 This response aligned with the
administration’s continuing position that its support is meant to protect Saudi Arabia’s ter-
ritorial integrity and to minimize civilian casualties without joining the Saudi-led coalition or
entering the Yemen war.67 In early October 2016—prior to the U.S. strikes against Houthi
sites—defense officials reportedly explained that U.S. involvement in coalition targeting was
limited to providing coordinates for “no-strike” locations (including civilian targets or infra-
structure) and that American officials did not help the coalition select munitions for individ-
ual attacks.68 According to news reports, a senior defense official said that
[f]or better or for worse, [the Saudis] own this campaign. . . . We want them to prosecute this cam-
paign in a way compliant with the laws of armed conflict and in a way that minimizes casualties in
Yemen, but ultimately we have our own campaign . . . to prosecute against the Islamic State.69
Despite the Obama administration’s delineation of its actions as distinct from those of the
coalition, critics have suggested various theories under which the United States could be liable
for coalitionmisconduct. To the extent these theories depend on the United States’ awareness
of such wrongdoing, they may be bolstered by a report recently released by a panel of inde-
pendent experts appointed by the UN Security Council. The panel conducted a detailed
investigation of the Yemen conflict and found “sufficient grounds to believe that the coalition
led by Saudi Arabia did not comply with international humanitarian law in at least 10 air
strikes that targeted houses, markets, factories and a hospital.”70
Many commentators have argued that the United States could be responsible for aiding or
assisting Saudi Arabia’s alleged violations of international law.71 Article 16 of the
International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility, which reflect cus-
tomary international law, establishes that a state may be responsible for another state’s
64 HRW Letter, supra note 63.
65 Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) reportedly said “[w]e are complicit and actively involved with war in Yemen,” yet
“[there has] been no debate in Congress . . . over whether or not we should be at war in Yemen.” Rosenberg &
Mazzetti, supra note 5. Senator Ted Lieu (D-Calif.) reportedly asked: “Why would we be refueling a jet carrying
bombs if we don’t know what target it’s about to strike? If we just refueled a jet that is hitting a hospital, that’s a
problem.” Ryan, supra note 6.
66 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing, supra note 61.
67 See U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Special Briefing, supra note 21.
68 Ryan, supra note 6.
69 Id.
70 See Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, at 3, transmitted by Letter Dated 27 January 2017 from the
Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2017/81 (2017).
71 E.g., Ryan Goodman & Miles Jackson, State Responsibility for Assistance to Foreign Forces (aka How to Assess
US-UK Support for Saudi Ops in Yemen), JUST SECURITY (Aug. 31, 2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/32628/
state-responsibility-assistance-foreign-forces-a-k-a-assess-us-uk-support-saudi-military-ops-yemen; Beth Van
Schaack, Evaluating Proportionality and Long-Term Civilian Harm Under the Laws of War, JUST SECURITY (Aug.
29, 2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/32577/evaluating-proportionality-long-term-civilian-harm-law-war.
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internationally wrongful act when that act would also be wrongful if committed by the former
state, and when the former state provided the aid or assistance with a view to facilitating the
wrongful act.72 Critics have also suggested that the United States has a duty under Common
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to ensure that other states do not violate the laws of
armed conflict (including the principles of distinction and proportionality).73 Lastly, com-
mentators have debated whether the United States could be liable for aiding and abetting
war crimes allegedly committed by the Saudi-led coalition.74
Although the U.S. administration does not appear to have addressed any of these particular
theories vis-à-vis its role in Yemen,75 its December 2016 Report on the Legal Framework
Guiding the Use of Force provides some insight into the White House’s reasoning. A section
titled “Working with Others in an Armed Conflict: International Law Considerations” reads,
in part, as follows:
The U.S. military’s ability to engage and work with partners can and often does turn on interna-
tional legal considerations. The United States military seeks to work with partners that will com-
ply with international law, and U.S. partners expect the same from the United States. The United
States’ commitment to upholding the law of armed conflict also extends to promoting compliance
by U.S. partners with the law of armed conflict. Receiving credible and reliable assurances that U.
S. partners will comply with applicable international law, including the law of armed conflict, is an
important measure that the United States military routinely employs in its partnered operations.
As a matter of policy, the United States always seeks to promote adherence to the law of armed
conflict and encourages other States and partners to do the same.
As a matter of international law, the United States looks to the law of State responsibility and U.S.
partners’ compliance with the law of armed conflict in assessing the lawfulness of U.S. military
assistance to, and joint operations with, military partners. The United States has taken the posi-
tion that a State incurs responsibility under international law for aiding or assisting another State
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act when: (1) the act would be internationally
wrongful if committed by the supporting State; (2) the supporting State is both aware that its
72 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
Commentaries, Art. 16 (2001). The text of Article 16 states only that the aid or assistance must be provided
“with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act”; however, the Commentaries attached
to the Draft Articles explain this limitation in part as requiring that the aid or assistance be provided “with a view to
facilitating the commission of that act.” Id. at cmt. 3. Commentators have noted and challenged the role of the
Commentaries in substantially limiting this element of Article 16. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook,
Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibility Articles, 96 AJIL 733, 789 (2002). See infra notes 77–79 and correspond-
ing text for further discussion of Article 16.
73 E.g., HarrietMoynihan, State Complicity in Other States’ Bad Acts—andHow to Avoid It, JUST SECURITY (Nov.
14, 2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/34379/state-complicity-states-bad-acts-and-avoid-2; Nathalie
Weizmann, Are the U.S. and U.K. Parties to the Saudi-led Armed Conflict Against the Houthis in Yemen?, JUST
SECURITY (Sept. 22, 2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/33095/u-s-u-k-parties-saudi-led-armed-conflict-hou-
this-yemen.
74 E.g., RyanGoodman,The Law of Aiding and Abetting (Alleged)War Crimes: How to Assess US and UK Support
for Saudi Strikes in Yemen, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 1, 2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/32656/law-aiding-abet-
ting-alleged-war-crimes-assess-uk-support-saudi-strikes-yemen.
75 Against this backdrop, Reuters published anOctober 10, 2016, article detailing previously undisclosed mate-
rial (obtained through the Freedom of Information Act) that illustrated U.S. officials’ debates—spanning from
mid-May 2015 to February 2016—as to whether the United States qualified as a “co-belligerent” in the
Yemen war and whether the United States could be exposed to allegations of LOAC violations. See Warren
Strobel & Jonathan Landay, Exclusive: As Saudis Bombed Yemen, U.S. Worried About Legal Blowback, REUTERS
(Oct. 10, 2016), at http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-saudi-yemen-exclusive-idUKKCN12A0BG. These
internal debates do not appear ever to have been discussed publicly.
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assistance will be used for an unlawful purpose and intends its assistance to be so used; and (3) the
assistance is clearly and unequivocally connected to the subsequent wrongful act.76
This position generally aligns with customary international law,77 though the U.S. Report
differs slightly from the ILC’s explanation of Article 16 in its Commentaries attached to
the Articles on State Responsibility. The Commentaries state: “There is no requirement
that the aid or assistance should have been essential to the performance of the internationally
wrongful act; it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act.”78 By requiring a “clear[]
and unequivocal[]” nexus between the assistance and the wrongful act, the U.S. Report seems
to set out a higher standard for establishing liability for aiding or assisting than does the ILC.
With the arrival of the Trump administration, it is unclear whether the United States will
continue to support the Saudi-led coalition while disclaiming any direct role in regional
hostilities. In a recent call between President Trump and King Salman bin Abd Al-Aziz Al
Saud of Saudi Arabia, the two leaders “underscor[ed] their personal commitment to
continued consultations on a range of regional and bilateral issues.”79
USE OF FORCE AND ARMS CONTROL
United States Expands Military Operations in North Africa and Classifies al-Shabaab as a Force
“Associated” with Al Qaeda
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.20
In late 2016, the United States took two steps to facilitate its confrontation with violent
extremist groups in North Africa. In December, the United States classified al-Shabaab as a
force “associated” with Al Qaeda for purposes of the 2001 Authorization to Use Military
Force (AUMF).1 And at some unspecified point earlier that year, it appears (but has not
been officially confirmed) that the United States and Tunisia reached a memorandum of
understanding under which U.S. forces are permitted to launch reconnaissance missions
aimed at extremists in Libya from an air base in Tunisia.2
Al-Shabaab, a nonstate actor that was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the
United States in March 2008,3 has captured large rural areas of south-central Somalia while
76 See REPORT GUIDING THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 30, at 14.
77 Compare Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 72, with REPORT GUIDING THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 30, at 14.
78 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 72, at cmt. 5; REPORT GUIDING THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 30, at 14.
79 White House Press Release, Readout of the President’s Call with King Salman bin Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud of
Saudi Arabia (Jan. 29, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/29/readout-presidents-
call-king-salman-bin-abd-al-aziz-al-saud-saudi-arabia.
1 The White House, Report on the Legal and Policy Framework Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force
and Related National Security Operations 5 (Dec. 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/white-
house.gov/files/documents/Legal_Policy_Report.pdf [hereinafter Legal Policy Report].
2 AdamEntous&MissyRyan,U.S.Has Secretly Expanded Its GlobalNetwork ofDrone Bases toNorth Africa,WASH.
POST (Oct. 26, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-has-secretly-expanded-its-
global-network-of-drone-bases-to-north-africa/2016/10/26/ff19633c-9b7d-11e6-9980-50913d68eacb_story.
html; Mark Hosenball & Andrea Shalal, U.S. Using Tunisia to Conduct Drone Operations in Libya: U.S. Sources,
REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2016), at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drones-tunisia-idUSKCN12Q2PW.
3 U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, at 401 (June 2, 2016), at https://www.state.gov/doc-
uments/organization/258249.pdf [hereinafter Country Reports on Terrorism].
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fighting Somali government forces and the African Union’s peacekeeping force (AMISOM).4
Even before the December 2016 announcement, the United States had been relying on the
AUMF—long interpreted by the executive branch to authorize force against “al Qaeda, the
Taliban, and associated forces”5—to justify strikes against some members of al-Shabaab.6
The theory was that these strikes were directed not against individuals in their capacity as
members of al-Shabaab but as individuals who satisfied the AUMF targeting criteria indepen-
dent of that membership.7 In March 2016, the Defense Department relied on this theory to
justify the bombing of an al-Shabaab training camp, noting that U.S. forces continued to rely
on the AUMF “as authority for direct action against a limited number of targets in Somalia
who, based on information about their current and historical activities, have been determined
to be part of al-Qa’ida.”8
The United States has also justified strikes against al-Shabaab—including, it appears, as a
matter of domestic law authorization—on the theories of self-defense and the defense of affil-
iated forces. The U.S. standing rules of engagement state that “[u]nit commanders always
retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile
act or demonstrated hostile intent.”9 Furthermore, the United States interprets the self-
defense doctrine to authorize actions to protect affiliated foreign forces.10 Pursuant to this
self-defense framework, the United States has justified attacks against al-Shabaab because
they protected U.S. personnel and fighters associated with AMISOM. For example, the
Defense Department also described the training camp strike as being “in the tactical defense
of U.S. and partner nation ground force units,” and as happening because “the fighters who
were to depart the camp posed an imminent threat to U.S. and African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) forces in Somalia.”11 Additional strikes against al-Shabaab in June,
4 Id. See alsoU.S. Mission in Geneva, Secretary Kerry Remarks with Kenyan Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed –
South Sudan, Somalia, Syria (Aug. 22, 2016), at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2016/08/23/secretary-kerry-
remarks-with-kenyan-foreign-minister-amina-mohamed-south-sudan-somalia-syria.
5 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 110 AJIL 587, 589 (2016).
6 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§1541 (2006)) (authorizing the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, orga-
nizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons . . . ”).
7 SeeDaugirdas &Mortenson, supra note 5, at 589. See alsoU.S. Dep’t of Defense, The Legal Framework for the
United States’ Use of Military Force Since 9/11 (Apr. 10, 2015), at https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/
Speech-View/Article/606662 (noting that the 2001 AUMF authorized the United States to conduct strikes
against “individuals who are part of al-Qa’ida in Somalia and Libya”).
8 Question to the Pentagon from Charlie Savage (Mar. 8, 2016), Answer from Lt. Col. Joe Sowers (Mar. 10,
2016), at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2757459/Shabab-DOD-Statement.pdf [hereinafter
DOD Question-Answer].
9 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTR. 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (SROE)/
STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (SRUF) FOR U.S. FORCES 83 (June 13, 2005).
10 Id.; Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 5, at 590.
11 DOD Question-Answer, supra note 8. See also U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Statement from
Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Airstrike in Somalia (Mar. 7, 2016), at https://www.defense.gov/
News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/687305/statement-from-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-
on-airstrike-in-somalia.
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July, and November 2015 were likewise justified as “in support of Somali forces, AMISOM
forces, and U.S. forces . . . .”12
This legal structure changed significantly when the White House informed Congress in
December 2016 that it had altered its classification of al-Shabaab and that it considered al-
Shabaab an organization affiliated with Al Qaeda.13 As part of a report to Congress regarding
U.S. military commitments, the administration stated that “[i]n Somalia, U.S. forces continue
to counter the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its Somalia-based associated force, al-
Shabaab.”14 The Obama administration explained the legal basis for its new determination
in a report summarizing the legal justifications for current U.S. uses of force overseas:
Althoughmuch of the intelligence underlying a determination that a group is covered by the 2001
AUMF is necessarily sensitive, many of these groups have made plain their continued allegiance
and operational ties to al-Qa’ida. For example, this determination was made recently with respect
to al-Shabaab because, among other things, al-Shabaab has pledged loyalty to al-Qa’ida in its pub-
lic statements; made clear that it considers the United States one of its enemies; and been respon-
sible for numerous attacks, threats, and plots against U.S. persons and interests in East Africa. In
short, al-Shabaab has entered the fight alongside al-Qa’ida and is a cobelligerent with al-Qa’ida in
hostilities against the United States, making it an “associated force” and therefore within the scope
of the 2001 AUMF.15
Although the White House’s legal policy report did not contain specific examples of al-
Shabaab attacks against U.S. forces, U.S. Africa Command in the past year has describedmul-
tiple attacks and attempted attacks by al-Shabaab against U.S. military personnel.16
Moreover, although al-Shabaab’s internal leadership has occasionally vacillated over whether
to affiliate with Al Qaeda,17 al-Shabaab’s leader in 2012 pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in a
recorded statement.18 Reports by the State Department and at least one NGO suggest that
this support has continued, even to the extent of purging members who sought to align the
group with ISIL instead of Al Qaeda.19
12 White House Press Release, Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution (Dec. 11, 2015), at https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/11/letter-president-war-powers-resolution. See also
DOD Question-Answer, supra note 8.




15 Legal Policy Report, supra note 1, at 5.
16 U.S. Africa Command Press Release, U.S. Self-Defense Strikes in Somalia (Sep. 27, 2016), at http://www.
africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/28414/u-s-self-defense-strikes-in-somalia; U.S. Africa Command Press
Release, U.S. Forces Conduct Defensive Fires in Somalia Against al-Shabaab Terrorists in May (June 17,
2016), at http://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/28236/u-s-forces-conduct-defensive-fires-in-somalia-
against-al-shabaab-terrorists-in-may. See also Homeland Security Committee, Terror Threat Snapshot 7 (Nov.
2016), at https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/November-2016-Terror-Threat-Snapshot.
pdf.
17 Aislinn Laing,How al-Qaeda and Islamic State Are Competing for al-Shabaab in Somalia, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 12,
2016), at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/12015075/How-al-Qaeda-and-Islamic-
State-are-fighting-for-al-Shabaab-affections-in-Somalia.html.
18 Al-Shabaab Joining al-Qaeda, Monitor Group Says, CNN (Feb. 10, 2012), at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/
02/09/world/africa/somalia-shabaab-qaeda/index.html.
19 See, e.g., International Crisis Group, Zakaria Yusuf & Abdul Khalif, The Islamic State Threat in Somalia’s
Puntland State (Nov. 17, 2016), at https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/islamic-state-threat-
somalias-puntland-state (“Al-Shabaab’s leaders have so far resisted bids by IS to switch their allegiance from al-
Qaeda. . . . Many suspected IS supporters have either been arrested or killed, among them the prominent Al-
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In addition to its discussion of domestic authorization, the administration’s legal policy
report also addressed the legality of attacks against al-Shabaab under international law.
According to the report, “[a]s a matter of international law, U.S. counterterrorism operations
in Somalia, including airstrikes, have been conducted with the consent of the Government of
Somalia in support of Somalia’s operations in the context of the armed conflict against al-
Shabaab and in furtherance of U.S. national self-defense.”20 This explanation is consistent
with the Obama administration’s past explanations for attacks against terrorist groups. In
an April 2016 speech at the American Society of International Law, the State Department
legal adviser had emphasized the U.S. view that states may “invoke[] the right of self-defense
to justify taking action on the territory of another State against non-State actors,” and that
“international law requires that States must either determine that they have the relevant gov-
ernment’s consent or . . . determine that the territorial State is ‘unable or unwilling’ to address
the threat posed by the non-State actor on its territory.”21
In addition to the United States’ expanded focus on al-Shabaab in Somalia, the media has
reported—but the U.S. government has not confirmed—that the United States and Tunisia
entered into amemorandum of understanding to facilitate reconnaissance of extremist groups
in Libya.22 According to the Washington Post and Reuters, the agreement allows the United
States to use Tunisian bases to launch unmanned drones for reconnaissance missions in
Libya.23 U.S. officials hope that access to the Tunisian base will facilitate the surveillance
of ISIL in Sirte, Libya—in particular by reducing travel distance and increasing “‘loiter’”
time for drone operations.24 Although the agreement is not yet public, a spokesperson for
U.S. Africa Command stated that “[t]here are U.S. service members working with the
Tunisian security forces for counter terrorism and they are sharing intelligence from various
sources, to include aerial platforms.”25
Tunisian officials have acknowledged that the United States is conducting surveillance
flights in Tunisia directed at ISIL targets in Libya. After a reporter asked Tunisian
President Beji Caid Essebsi whether the United States was using Tunisian air space for recon-
naissance missions, Essebsi stated “[y]es, and it was at our request.”26 Mr. Essebsi elaborated
that “our agreement with the U.S. was to share intelligence information,” and that the recon-
naissance would help Tunisia prevent cross-border raids into Tunisian territory.27 Tunisian
officials also stated that the United States planned to provide Tunisia with drones to conduct
Shabaab commander, Abu Nu’man Sakow.”). See also Country Reports on Terrorism, supra note 3, at 11 (“Later
in the year, factions formed and defections increased as the appeal of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
created divisions within al-Shabaab’s core leadership. The organization maintained its allegiance to al-Qa’ida,
however, in spite of public appeals from other terrorist groups . . . .”).
20 Legal Policy Report, supra note 1, at 17.
21 Brian Egan, State Department Legal Adviser, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law
Annual Meeting: International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign (Apr. 1, 2016), at
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/255493.htm.
22 Entous & Ryan, supra note 2; Hosenball & Shalal, supra note 2.
23 Id.
24 Entous & Ryan, supra note 2
25 Hosenball & Shalal, supra note 2.
26 Tarek Amara, Tunisia Confirms U.S. Drones over Libyan Border, Monitor Islamic State, REUTERS (Nov. 23,
2016), at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-security-usa-idUSKBN13I14O.
27 Id.
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its own surveillance missions. Tunisian Defense Minister Farhat Horchani told state news
agency TAP that “Tunisia wants to initiate the National Army to the use of this equipment
to monitor the southern borders and detect any suspected movement.”28 Despite acknowl-
edging cooperation with the United States, Tunisian officials denied that the United States
had established bases in Tunisia or was launching attacks from Tunisia.29 The Tunisian
Defense Ministry stated, “[w]e refute what has been circulated in a number of foreign
news outlets claiming the presence of US military bases in Tunisia and that the Tunisian
soil is being used to strike targets in Libya.”30
The reported U.S. agreement with Tunisia follows the Obama administration’s decision in
2015 to designate Tunisia as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA).31 Tunisia became the six-
teenth nation to be so designated.32 According to the State Department, “MNNA status is a
symbol of our close relationship [with Tunisia] and comes with tangible privileges including
eligibility for training, loans of equipment for cooperative research and development, and
Foreign Military Financing for commercial leasing of certain defense articles.”33 Since the
United States designated Tunisia a MNNA, the State Department preliminarily approved
approximately $100 million in foreign military assistance to Tunisia, including twenty-
four OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Helicopters.34 A manager for the U.S. AFRICOM Regional
Operations Directorate stated that “[t]he Tunisian Air Force plan is to use the Kiowas as part
of its main defense against violent extremist organizations conducting terrorist attacks onmil-
itary and civilian targets in Tunisia from remote domestic bases and Libya.”35
28 Tunisia Takes Receipt of Reconnaissance and Surveillance Aircraft, Drones (Farhat Horchani), AGENCE TUNIS
AFRIQUE PRESSE (Oct. 26, 2016), at http://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Politics/8362587-tunisia-takes-receipt-of-
reconnaissance.
29 Ahmed Nadhif,Where Does US-Tunisian Military Cooperation End?, AL-MONITOR (Nov. 1, 2016), at http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/11/tunisia-us-military-cooperation-secret-base-fight-terrorism.html.
See also Tunisia, Sovereign Country, It Is Not Home to Any ForeignMilitary Base (Harchani), AGENCE TUNIS AFRIQUE
PRESSE (Oct. 27, 2016), at http://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Politics/8365234-tunisia-sovereign-country-it-is-
not.
30 Nadif, supra note 29.
31 U.S. Dep’t of State,Designation of Tunisia As aMajor Non-NATOAlly (July 10, 2015), at https://2009-2017.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244811.htm [hereinafter State Dep’t Press Release on Designating Tunisia as an
MNNA]; White House Press Release, Presidential Memorandum – Designation of the Republic of Tunisia as a
Major Non-NATO Ally (July 10, 2015), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/10/
presidential-memorandum-designation-republic-tunisia-major-non-nato-ally.
32 State Dep’t Press Release on Designating Tunisia as an MNNA, supra note 31.
33 Id.
34 U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Tunisia-OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Aircraft
Equipment and Support (May 3, 2016), at http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/tunisia-oh-58d-kiowa-warrior-
aircraft-equipment-and-support.
35 U.S. Army, Security Enterprise Strengthens Tunisian Air Force (Jan. 27, 2017), at https://www.army.mil/arti-
cle/181455/security_enterprise_strengthens_tunisian_air_force. Tunisia received six of the Kiowa Helicopters in
February 2017. Chahed Inspects Helicopters Delivered to National Army, AGENCE TUNIS AFRIQUE PRESSE (Feb. 4,
2017), at http://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Politics/8681783-chahed-inspects.
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